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NLRB V. CANNING FEATURING THE ALL-
POWERFUL SENATE:  THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD’S JOURNEY TO 
EXTINCTON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world where unions and individual workers are unable to 
guarantee their rights.1  Grace Johnson, a teacher at a local elementary 
school, is a member of the teachers’ union, the American Federation of 
Teachers.  Grace has taught at the same school for ten years, and she enjoys 
her job.  Right before Christmas break, she arrives at the school to discover 
she has lost her job due to “budget reasons.”  Grace is shocked, and does 
not believe the budget is the only reason she was fired.  She contacts her 
union representative, and he tells her he will look into her case.  Later that 
month, the union representative finds out that Grace was replaced by a 
non-union teacher.  The union representative informs Grace that the 
school may have discriminated against her because she is a union 
employee, which is an unfair labor practice.  Grace really wants her job 
back, so the union representative files a complaint on her behalf with the 
regional National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”), and 
the union representative assures her that there is a good chance the NLRB 
will overturn her discharge. 
While Grace waits for a result from the regional NLRB, she struggles 
to pay her bills because the school refuses to continue paying her.  The 
regional NLRB investigates and reports its findings to the Administrative 
Law Judge (“ALJ”) who ultimately decides in favor of the school because 
Grace was paid more than the non-union teacher; therefore, budget cuts 
were a sufficient reason for her discharge.  Grace is devastated, but the 
union representative informs her that her case can be appealed to the 
NLRB headquarters in Washington, D.C.  Grace waits patiently, still 
without a job or an income for three more months.  To her dismay, she 
learns the NLRB cannot decide any cases because it only has two 
members.  Grace is left with nothing because there is no way to appeal her 
discharge. 
All individuals should have a way to ensure their workers’ rights, 
including unlawful discharge, regardless of the level of severity of an 
issue.  If workers’ rights and benefits were not guaranteed, the country 
would revert back to the times before the National Labor Relations Act 
                                                 
1 This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author to illustrate the issues 
presented in this Note. 
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(“NLRA”).2  The NLRB provides regulation for employers, employees, 
and unions in disputes arising from the labor relationship.3  If the NLRB 
became extinct, there would be no enforcement of employer, employee, or 
union benefits and rights.4 
NLRB v. Canning arose after President Obama appointed three 
members to the NLRB during a three day recess the Senate took from 
January 3–6, 2012.5  The Supreme Court held that the recess appointment 
power was more specific than President Obama interpreted.6  It held that 
there must be a substantial break in the Senate—at least ten days—and the 
Senate can declare when they are in session.7 
As a result, the holding invalidated the three recent appointments, 
setting off a domino effect.8  Because the appointments were invalid, all of 
the cases that those three members were involved in may be appealed due 
to the lack of a quorum of valid members on the NLRB.9  The re-evaluation 
of these cases and possible modification of decisions could have a grave 
impact on labor and employment law.10 
                                                 
2 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012) (showing the various parts of the NLRA). 
3 See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, WHAT WE DO, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-
we-do [http://perma.cc/Y7A4-PKKP] (displaying the rights the NLRB protects and various 
ways to resolve issues); see also NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, RIGHTS WE PROTECT, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect [http://perma.cc/Z96Z-JD57] (explaining the 
rights the NLRB protects). 
4 See Ian Millhiser, In Less Than 5 Years, Unions Could Lose Their Legal Rights—And It’s the 
Supreme Court’s Fault, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 13, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
justice/2014/01/13/3155141/5-years-unions-lose-legal-rights-supreme-courts-fault/ 
[http://perma.cc/8PXD-9WPZ] (predicting what would happen if the NLRB were 
powerless to act).  The article states: 
If the NLRB is powerless to act, there will be no one to enforce workers’ 
rights to join a union without intimidation from their employer.  No one 
to enforce workers’ rights to join together to oppose abusive work 
conditions.  And no one to make an employer actually bargain with a 
union. 
Id. 
5 See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557–58 (2014) (elaborating on why Noel Canning 
filed a case against the NLRB); infra Part II.D (discussing further NLRB v. Canning). 
6 See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577–78 (holding that the Recess Appointment Clause allows 
the President to fill any vacancy as long as the break in the Senate is of sufficient length). 
7 See id. at 2567 (elaborating on the Supreme Court’s holding). 
8 See id. at 2578 (stating that President Obama’s recess appointments were 
unconstitutional); Justin Keith et al., The Supreme Court Declares a Recess for Recess 
Appointments, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/print/ 
article/supreme-court-declares-recess-recess-appointments [http://perma.cc/4587-WU8K] 
(explaining the reason why members were invalidated). 
9 See infra Part II.C (discussing the quorum requirement of the NLRB); see also New 
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (holding that a valid quorum consists of 
three members). 
10 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the effect reexamining cases could have on the NLRB). 
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In the past five years, there have been three instances when the 
NLRB’s membership fell to a mere two members on what is statutorily 
construed to be a five-member board.11  Two of these three instances were 
solved through the presidential recess appointment power.12  The holding 
in NLRB v. Canning made the use of the recess appointment power to fix 
shortages on the NLRB more difficult.13  As a result, if the President and 
Senate do not agree on an appointment to the NLRB, the Board’s 
membership will continue to fall as each member’s term ends, and the 
board will eventually become non-operational.14  Therefore, the NLRB 
needs to change its enabling statute in order to continue to operate 
effectively and prevent the changes to presidential recess appointment 
power from affecting its declining membership.  This Note recommends 
that Congress amend 29 U.S.C. § 153 to ensure the NLRB is operational if 
appointments are not proposed by the President or confirmed by the 
Senate.15 
First, Part II discusses the history of the NLRB, the developments and 
evolution of the Board, and the cases that have influenced the board’s 
structure.16  Next, Part III analyzes how the NLRB’s operation has been 
disrupted in the past and will continue to be disrupted if no changes are 
made.17  In addition, Part III proposes an amendment to the NLRB’s 
enabling statute, correcting the NLRB’s membership problems.18  Finally, 
                                                 
11 See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 [http://perma.cc/HC47-
V94G] (displaying that the NLRB has fallen to below three members twelve times since its 
creation with three of those times being in the past five years). 
12 See id. (showing that after New Process Steel in 2010, two members were recess 
appointed); see also  NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557–58 (2014) (explaining President 
Obama’s recess appointment of three members to the NLRB). 
13 See infra Part II.D (reviewing NLRB v. Canning); see also infra Part II.E.1 (discussing the 
actions the NLRB has taken thus far). 
14 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring Senate confirmation on presidential 
appointments); see also Ian Millhiser, Why Senate Democrats Had To Invoke The “Nuclear 
Option,” THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 21, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/ 
11/21/2972671/senate-democrats-invoke-nuclear-option/ [http://perma.cc/FS2M-N5E4] 
[hereinafter Millhiser, Nuclear Option] (“[A]ll five slots on the NLRB are now filled by Senate-
confirmed appointees—this solution is only temporary.  NLRB members serve five year 
terms, so the Senate GOP will get another opportunity to shut down federal labor law when 
these terms expire . . . .”). 
15 See infra Part III.C.1 (explaining the language that this Note proposes to add to the 
NLRB’s enabling statute); see also The Legislative Process, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process/ 
[http://perma.cc/NX2L-G5E4] (examining the process of amending a statute). 
16 See infra Part II (explaining the history and background to the problem this Note 
proposes to fix). 
17 See infra Part III.A–B (analyzing the NLRB’s membership problem). 
18 See infra Part III.C (providing the proposed amendment’s language). 
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Part IV concludes with a summation of how the proposed amendment 
addresses the current problems.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The NLRB is an independent administrative agency that enforces and 
makes decisions regarding employee, employer, and union rights.20  The 
NLRB was created in 1935 and has a variety of functions in the field of 
labor and employment law, including enforcing an employee’s right to 
collectively bargain and join unions, and preventing unfair labor 
practices.21  Throughout history, case law changed how members are 
appointed to the NLRB and how many members are required in order for 
the NLRB to function properly.22  Specifically, NLRB v. Canning and New 
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB changed these practices.23 
First, Part II.A explains the history of the NLRB.24  Part II.B discusses 
how the NLRB is organized and the functions it performs.25  Next, Part 
II.C discusses the quorum requirement of the NLRB and the impact of New 
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB.26  Part II.D explains NLRB v. Canning and how 
it impacts the NLRB.27  Part II.E establishes the NLRB’s fallout since the 
NLRB v. Canning decision, and the Senate’s desire to change the NLRB.28  
Finally, Part II.F introduces the Federal Communications Commission as 
a possible model for the NLRB.29 
                                                 
19 See infra Part IV (concluding the reasons why this Note proposes the best solution). 
20 See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, WHO WE ARE, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-
we-are [http://perma.cc/3DTC-CFG4] (stating that the NLRB is an independent agency and 
noting the rights it protects). 
21 See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE 1935 PASSAGE OF THE WAGNER ACT, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act 
[http://perma.cc/C85Y-LG38] (explaining how the NLRB was created); see also Julia Di Vito, 
Note, The New Meaning of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 314 
(2011) (establishing why the NLRB was created and what it does). 
22 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (requiring three members 
for there to be a valid quorum); see also NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577–78 (2014) 
(stating that the Recess Appointments Clause can be used to appoint members only when 
there is a sufficient break in the Senate). 
23 See infra Part II.C–D (displaying the case law that has changed the NLRB). 
24 See infra Part II.A (outlining the history of the NLRB). 
25 See infra Part II.B (explaining the structure and function of the NLRB). 
26 See infra Part II.C (showing the impact that New Process Steel had on the NLRB). 
27  See infra Part II.D (analyzing the impact of NLRB v. Canning). 
28 See infra Part II.E (stating what the NLRB has already done). 
29 See infra Part II.F (examining the structure of the Federal Communications 
Commission). 
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A. The History of the National Labor Relations Board 
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”) created the 
NLRB.30  The purpose of the NLRA was “[t]o diminish the causes of labor 
disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce, [and] 
to create a National Labor Relations Board . . . .”31  The NLRA afforded 
workers with three rights:  (1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain 
collectively; and (3) the right to engage in strikes, picketing, and other 
concerted activities.32  The NLRB originally consisted of a three-member 
                                                 
30 See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (displaying the 
original NLRA); see also S. 1958, 74th Cong., § 3(a) (1935) (stating the interest to establish the 
NLRB).  The NLRA was created to allow workers to unionize and engage in collective 
bargaining.  FRANK W. MCCULLOCH & TIM BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD 3 (Ernest S. Griffith & Hugh Langdon Elsbree eds., 1974).  The NLRA consists of three 
separate statutes:  The National Labor Relations Act or Wagner Act of 1935, the Taft-Hartley 
Act of 1947, and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.  Id. at 16.  When President Roosevelt signed 
the NLRA he issued a message: 
A better relationship between labor and management is the high 
purpose of this act.  By assuring the employees the right of collective 
bargaining it fosters the development of the employment contract on a 
sound and equitable basis.  By providing for an orderly procedure for 
determining who is entitled to represent the employees, it aims to 
remove one of the chief causes of wasteful economic strife.  By 
preventing practices which tend to destroy the independence of labor it 
seeks, for every worker within its scope, that freedom which is justly 
his. 
Id. at 18. 
31 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, pmbl., 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935).  “In the 
midst of economic strife, the Act sought to establish a uniform set of principles with 
employee free choice regarding unionization . . . .”  John W. Bowers, Section 8(a)(2) and 
Participative Management:  An Argument for Judicial and Legislative Change in a Modern 
Workplace, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 525, 533 (1992).  “Senator Wagner[] believed that enforcement 
of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively with employers would achieve 
industrial peace and stability.”  Id. at 534. 
32 See JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 28–29 (H. Victoria Hedian et al. 
eds., 6th ed. 2012) (establishing the rights that the Wagner Act provided).  Section 7 was one 
of the most important portions of the NLRA.  Id. at 28.  Section 7 stated:  “Employees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  Id. 
 Sections 3–6 of the NLRA created the NLRB.  See id. at 29 (establishing the NLRB to 
administer the rights of the NLRA).  Section 9 of the NLRA furthered this creation by giving 
the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over questions of employee representation.  Id.  See also 
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 3–6, 49 Stat. 449, 451–52 (1935) 
(displaying the structure of the NLRB as it was created in 1935).  Sections 3 and 4 created 
structural guidelines for the NLRB.  See id. §§ 3–4 (noting the structure and salary of the 
Board).  Section 5 stated that the principle office would be the District of Columbia and that 
the Board or any agent of the Board may prosecute any inquiry necessary to its function in 
any part of the United States.  Id. § 5.  Next, Section 6 allowed the Board to make rules and 
regulations.  Id. § 6. 
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board with five-year staggered terms.33  “The three-member NLRB was 
entrusted with administering both the unfair labor practice and the 
election provisions of the law.”34  At the time of creation, the NLRB faced 
strong resistance from critics who felt it was one-sided in nature and 
should be unconstitutional.35 
                                                 
 First, the right to organize is the right to join together as a group or join a union.  See 
Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 
265 (2005) (elaborating on the right to join unions).  Next, the right to bargain collectively 
“consists of negotiations between an employer and a group of employees so as to determine 
the conditions of employment.”  Collective Bargaining and Labor Arbitration:  An Overview, 
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collective_bargaining 
[http://perma.cc/4BUP-AZFE].  Last, the right to engage in strikes, picketing, and other 
concerted activities means that employees have the right to protest the way their employer 
is treating them.  See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/strikes [http://perma.cc/9Z3U-3FB8] (explaining further the right to 
strike). 
33 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 13 (presenting the structure of the 
NLRB).  See also National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) 
(discussing the terms of the NLRB members).  The NLRB’s terms are structured in the 
following manner: 
One of the original members shall be appointed for a term of one year, 
one for a term of three years, and one for a term of five years, but their 
successors shall be appointed for terms to five years each, except that 
any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only of the 
unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. 
Id. 
34 MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 24.  See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 74-198, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (“Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”).  In addition, Section 8 governs 
what is an unfair labor practice.  Id. § 8; see also John Jacob Kobus, Jr., Note, Establishing 
Corporate Counsel’s Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1343, 1398 (1995) 
(explaining that an employer may not interfere with an employee’s rights).  In the election 
process, the NLRB may investigate when a question affecting commerce arises, which 
concerns the representation of employees.  National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 
§ 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935). 
 In addition to the NLRA establishing the national office of the NLRB, it also established 
twenty-one regional offices around the country.  MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 
25.  Regional directors and regional attorneys supervise the work of attorneys and 
investigators.  Id.  Today, the Board has twenty-six regional offices located in various areas 
around the country.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, REGIONAL OFFICES, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices [http://perma.cc/93PP-DRKD].  
Typically, parties will first send a complaint to the regional NLRB, and if it is not resolved in 
its process then the national office of the NLRB looks at it.  See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, INVESTIGATE CHARGES, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges 
[http://perma.cc/HE24-UE9B] (outlining the process for filing charges and appealing 
charges). 
35 See HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 30–31 (arguing that the NLRA was a “one-sided” act); 
see also JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 16–18 (Harvard Univ. Press 2014) 
(highlighting Republican disapproval of unions); Labor Day Brings Focus to Economy, 
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As a result, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 amended the NLRA.36  The 
Taft-Hartley Act shifted the NLRA’s focus on the rights of employees and 
unions to a more balanced concentration “that added restrictions on 
unions and also guaranteed certain freedoms of speech and conduct to 
employers and individual employees.”37  The Taft-Hartley Act changed 
the composition of the NLRB from three to five members.38  This growth 
was a welcomed change since three members were not enough to keep up 
with the heavy workload of the NLRB.39  Further, the Taft-Hartley Act 
                                                 
Declining Union Membership, FOX NEWS (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/ 
2014/09/01/holiday-returns-focus-to-impact-organized-labor-on-economy-declining-
union/ [http://perma.cc/F7SQ-U2DM] (showing a decline in union support).  Many critics 
strictly opposed the NLRA’s favor of organized labor.  ROSENFELD, supra note 35, at 17.  Critic 
James MacGregor Burns wrote that the NLRA was “the most radical legislation passed 
during the New Deal, in the sense that it altered fundamentally the nation’s politics by 
vesting massive economic and political power in organized labor.”  MCCULLOCH & 
BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 18 (internal quotations omitted). 
36 See Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (displaying the contents of 
the Taft-Hartley Act).  See also HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 34, 36 (presenting the need for 
an amendment to the NLRA).  The problem areas were: 
(1) the secondary boycott, which had proved to be a potent tool in the 
hands of some unions, injuring not only the immediate parties to the 
labor dispute, but disinterested third parties as well; (2) closed- and 
union-shop agreements, which in many instances had led to abuse and 
certainly contributed to labor’s political and economic strength; (3) 
strikes and picketing, which had often turned into violence when unions 
were unable to achieve their goals by peaceful means; (4) corruption, 
which had appeared in some unions, although it was not as conspicuous 
during the 1940s as it later became during the 1957 McClellan Senate 
Committee on Improper Activities in Labor-Management Relations 
investigation; and (5) frequent jurisdictional disputes between unions in 
the construction industry, which had halted many large projects for long 
periods as unions bickered about the rights of different employees to 
various job assignments. 
Id. at 38. 
37 HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 41.  The Taft-Hartley Act amended Section 1 to be directed 
equally at labor unions by stating that “[c]ertain practices by some labor 
organizations . . . have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing 
commerce . . . through strikes . . . or concerted activities . . . .  The elimination of such 
practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.”  Id.  The 
Taft-Hartley Act also amended Section 7 of the NLRA by adding a provision, which gave 
employees the right to refrain from joining a labor organization.  Id. at 42. 
38 See id. at 42 (establishing the change in the NLRB from a three-member board to a five-
member board). 
39 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 45 (expanding the NLRB from three to 
five members).  “Given the Board’s heavy work load, this was not a controversial 
amendment.”  Id.  The statistics reveal that the NLRB handled on average 8700 cases per year 
until the Taft-Hartley Amendment.  See National Labor Relations Board, Twelfth Annual 
Report of the National Labor Relations Board for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1947, UNITED 
STATES PRINTING OFFICE 1, 83 (1947) (displaying a chart with the number of cases the NLRB 
handles each year).  See also infra Part II.B (explaining all of the NLRB’s duties). 
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required at least a three-member quorum for decisions, which became a 
hurdle for the NLRB.40 
The last amendment to the NLRA was the Landrum-Griffin Act of 
1959, which was a response to the abuse of union power, even though it 
actually made very few changes to the NLRA.41  Since the Landrum-
Griffin Act, there have been no other major changes to the NLRB or its 
enabling statute.42  Today, the NLRB consists of up to five members who 
perform a variety of functions, including:  conducting elections, 
investigating charges, facilitating settlements, enforcing orders, and 
deciding cases.43  These duties are split between regional offices and the 
                                                 
40 See Di Vito, supra note 21, at 314–15 (stating that the NLRB can delegate its authority).  
The new portion of Section 3(b) states: 
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more 
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise.  A vacancy 
in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to 
exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board 
shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two 
members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant 
to the first sentence hereof. 
Id. at 315.  See also infra Part II.B–C (addressing the quorum requirement of the NLRB). 
41 See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. 
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (amending the NLRA to create a fairer agreement for both 
employees and employers).  See also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 65 
(explaining how the Landrum-Griffin Act amended the NLRA).  It specifically amended 
seven portions of the Taft-Hartley Act.  See id. at 65–69 (outlining all seven areas of the 
amendment).  First, the Landrum-Griffin Act closed the loop-holes in secondary boycotts by 
adding a prohibition against hot-cargo agreements to Section 8.  Id. at 65–66.  Next, it 
regulated organization and recognition picketing by creating a new unfair labor practice 
prohibition against unions.  Id. at 66.  Then, it adjusted the pre-hire requirements by making 
an exception for the construction industry.  Id.  It also allowed economic strikers, strike 
replacements, and non-strikers to vote in elections.  Id. at 66–67.  It permitted the Board to 
delegate functions to the regional boards.  MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 67–
68.  Last, the Landrum-Griffin Act repealed the non-communist affidavit provisions and 
provided that state courts and agencies could regulate the interstate labor disputes.  Id. at 68.  
Overall, “the new legislation made only relatively minor changes in the fundamental 
structure of the federal labor laws erected by the [NLRA].”  Id. at 69. 
42 See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (enabling the NLRB to act as an independent agency). 
43 See STANLEY R. STRAUSS & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1–3 (5th ed. 1996) (establishing the responsibilities of 
the NLRB).  The NLRB’s major responsibilities include “the investigation, processing, and 
resolution of unfair labor practice charges and the determination of which labor 
organizations, if any, should represent employees in collective bargaining matters.”  Id. at 1.  
See also WHAT WE DO, supra note 3 (explaining all the functions of the NLRB).  In order to 
unionize, an employee must show that at least thirty percent of employees at the workplace 
are interested in joining a union and then notify the NLRB.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, CONDUCT ELECTIONS, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-elections 
[http://perma.cc/89WC-HY64].  In addition, the NLRB investigates any charges filed in 
regard to a violation of NLRA rights.  See INVESTIGATE CHARGES, supra note 34 (explaining 
the process that the NLRB follows to investigate charges).  These charges can resolve 
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national board.44  The purpose of the regional and national offices is to 
uphold the NLRA by ensuring the rights of employees, employers, and 
unions.45 
                                                 
settlements or result in a decision from an ALJ if a settlement cannot be reached.  WHAT WE 
DO, supra note 3.  Last, if the parties do not voluntarily uphold the order the NLRB has issued, 
it must seek enforcement from the Court of Appeals.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
ENFORCE ORDERS, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/enforce-orders [http://perma.cc/ 
CT55-DGU7]. 
44 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 79–81 (dividing the duties of the NLRB 
between the national and regional offices).  The regional boards initiate and investigate all 
the cases that the NLRB handles.  Id. at 81.  The regional boards also conduct all the union 
elections.  Id.  This Note will only focus on the national duties of the NLRB. 
45 See WHAT WE DO, supra note 3 (establishing all the NLRB’s duties and its purpose); see 
also National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, pmbl., 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (showing 
the purpose of the NLRA).  The NLRB’s regional offices are analogous to the trial court level 
in a court system; they investigate, research and discuss each unfair labor practice case.  See 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCESS CHART, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process/unfair-labor-practice-process-chart 
[http://perma.cc/K6HB-6QLZ] (displaying the process for filing an unfair labor practice 
charge).  An unfair labor practice case arises from a violation of Section 8 of the NLRA, which 
governs the activities employers shall not engage in, the activities unions shall not engage 
in, and the activities that both are prohibited from engaging in.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) 
(highlighting the unfair labor practices).   See also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, 
at 143 (listing the prohibited activities for employers and unions).  Employers shall not: 
[i]nterfere with, coerce, or restrain employees[;] . . . [a]ssist or dominate 
labor organizations[;] . . . [d]iscriminate against employees to 
discourage or encourage union membership, except that a lawful union 
security clause may be signed[;] . . . [d]iscriminate against employees 
because they have given testimony or filed charges with the Board[; 
or] . . . [r]efuse to bargain in good faith with a majority union. 
Id.  Unions shall not: 
[c]oerce or restrain employees or interfere with management’s choice of 
a bargaining agent[;] . . . [c]ause an employer to discriminate against 
employees illegally[;] . . . [r]efuse to bargain in good faith with an 
employer[;] . . . [e]ngage in secondary boycotts or jurisdictional 
strikes[;] . . . [c]harge excessive or discriminatory initiation 
fees[;] . . . [e]ngage in featherbedding[; or] . . . [e]ngage in organization 
or recognition picketing. 
Id.  Finally, neither a union nor employer shall “[e]nter into ‘hot cargo’ agreements.”  Id. 
When the charge is received, an attorney is assigned to investigate the facts and conduct 
any interviews needed.  Id. at 85.  After investigation, the regional director receives a 
recommendation whether to pursue the unfair labor practice complaint.  Id.  If at the end of 
this process a person is not satisfied he or she can appeal the decision by petitioning the 
national NLRB to review the case.  See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 85–89. 
(stating that it is simple to appeal to the national office of the NLRB). 
In addition to investigating, deciding, settling, and enforcing orders on cases, the 
regional offices also facilitate representation elections.  See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, THE NLRB PROCESS, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process 
[http://perma.cc/F7UR-C5KF] (displaying a chart which describes the process of 
representation elections).  When a party files a petition for a representation election with the 
union office, it is investigated and determined.  Id.  Then, it can go through either consent 
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The history of the NLRB significantly influenced how the Board 
operates today.46  The NLRA established the NLRB, its purpose, and the 
duties it performs.47  Although the amendments to the enabling statute 
helped the NLRB evolve, cases have also impacted the NLRB’s 
organization.48 
B. The NLRB’s Organization 
The NLRB is organized into a five-member board at the national level 
with twenty-six regional offices.49  The President either appoints members 
of the NLRB with Senate confirmation, or the President appoints members 
by using the recess appointment power.50  First, Part II.B.1 discusses the 
NLRB’s structure.51  Next, Part II.B.2 explains how NLRB members are 
appointed.52 
1. How the NLRB is Structured 
At the national level, each of the five board members has their own 
Chief Counsel and staff of attorneys.53  These members help the NLRB 
review the records of unfair labor practice cases and write the decision of 
each case.54  The NLRB also has a General Counsel, which supervises the 
                                                 
procedures, in which parties consent to an election and waive their hearing, or other formal 
procedures.  Id.  If a petition goes through the formal procedures, a hearing is held, a decision 
is made by the regional director, and parties may request for a review of the decision.  Id.  
After this process, the regional director conducts the election and if there are no objections, 
the director issues results.  Id. 
46 See supra Part II.A (explaining how the NLRB was created and the changes that have 
been made to the Board since its creation). 
47 See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, pmbl., 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) 
(showing the purpose of the NLRA). 
48 See infra Part II.C−D (elaborating on the New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB and NLRB v. 
Canning holdings and their effect on the NLRB). 
49 See REGIONAL OFFICES, supra note 34 (stating that the NLRB has twenty-six regional 
offices around the country).  See also TANJA L. THOMPSON, GWYNNE A. WILCOX & BARRY J. 
KEARNEY, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW:  THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 248 (BNA Supplement 2013) (establishing that there used to be thirty-
two offices).  “The regional office restructuring program began with the merger of regional 
offices in Atlanta, Georgia . . . and Winston-Salem, North Carolina . . . .”  Id. 
50 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (presenting the presidential appointment power); see also 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (granting the President recess appointment power). 
51 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the structure of the NLRB). 
52 See infra Part II.B.2 (examining how members get appointed to the NLRB). 
53 See HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 2826 (explaining all of the components that make up 
the national office of the NLRB). 
54 See id. (expanding on the role of the legal staff of the NLRB).  The role of legal staff is as 
follows: 
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attorneys on the board, governs different aspects of the regional offices, 
and oversees the NLRB as a whole.55  In addition, the NLRB’s ALJs preside 
over unfair labor practice hearings.56  Although the NLRB has many parts, 
this Note focuses on the five-member national board and its role in labor 
and employment law.57 
The national level of the NLRB is analogous to a court of appeals 
because it investigates contested cases and elections.58  Each year, the 
NLRB issues approximately 1400 decisions from contested cases.59  In 
                                                 
If the case is a simple one, clearly covered by Board precedent, the legal 
staff will often prepare a draft decision for approval by a three-member 
panel of the Board.  If the decision raises arguable questions, it may be 
referred for further consideration to a subpanel of supervisory attorneys 
from staffs of the three different Board members and then to a panel of 
three Board members.  Only cases thought to be particularly important 
are discussed by the full Board. 
Id. 
55 See id. at 2827 (“General Counsel ‘shall exercise general supervision over all attorneys 
employed by the Board . . . and over the officers and employees in the regional offices.’”).  
The General Counsel’s authority is not reviewable by the courts.  Id.  There are four main 
divisions of the General Counsel:  Division of Enforcement Litigation, Division of Advice, 
Division of Operations-Management, and Division of Administration.  Id. at 2828.  The 
Division of Enforcement Litigation handles all enforcement, review, and contempt litigation 
in the court of appeals and Supreme Court.  HIGGINS, JR., supra note 32, at 2828.  The Division 
of Advice gives legal advice to regional offices, the injunction litigation branch, and the 
policy branch.  Id.  The Division of Operations-Management coordinates the work with both 
the regional offices and the national office.  Id.  Last, the Division of Administration aids with 
administrative, fiscal, and personnel management services for both the Board and the 
General Counsel.  Id.  Although the General Counsel does a lot for the NLRB, it is not the 
focus of this Note. 
56 See id. (establishing the duties of ALJs on the NLRB).  The ALJs conduct formal hearings 
for all of the General Counsel’s complaints.  Id.  These judges function like trial court judges 
in non-jury hearings because they perform many of the same duties.  See HIGGINS, JR., supra 
note 32, at 2829 (comparing ALJs in NLRB proceedings to trial court judges).  The decisions 
of the ALJs are final unless the parties appeal.  Id. 
57 See infra Part III (analyzing the national office and structure of the NLRB). 
58 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 82 (explaining the process the national 
office uses to review cases).  See also STRAUSS & HIGGINS, supra note 43, at 85−105 (detailing 
the intricate, trial-like process for appealing a regional board decision).  After the regional 
board issues a complaint, an ALJ presides over the case at a hearing.  Id. at 94–99.  At the 
close of the hearing and submission of the briefs, the judge issues a decision containing 
findings of fact, conclusions, and the reasons or basis of its decision.  Id. at 99.  After the 
decision is issued, if a party wants a reconsideration or rehearing of the case, he or she must 
file a motion within twenty-eight days of the issuance of the decision.  Id. at 103.  The motion 
must state the error in the decision and it is looked over by a panel of NLRB members.  Id. 
59 MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 82.  An unfair labor practice case starts with 
an aggrieved employee filing a charge that an employer or labor organization committed an 
unfair labor practice.  Id. at 85.  Any person can file a charge with the NLRB even if they do 
not have an interest in the outcome of the case.  Id.  When the regional office receives the 
charge, an attorney investigates the facts, which sometimes involves an interview of the 
aggrieved party or witnesses.  Id.  The attorney then recommends to the regional director 
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order to review a case or contested election, the NLRB examines the record 
that the regional office and the ALJ created.60  After reviewing the record, 
the NLRB rules on the issue, which requires at least three votes to be 
valid.61 
Any party who is not satisfied with the ruling of the NLRB can appeal 
to the federal court of appeals.62  The federal court system typically 
upholds the decisions of the NLRB and may give deference to the Board 
because of its expertise in labor and employment law.63  Critics maintain 
that one problem when appealing to a federal court is that the NLRB’s 
order is put on hold during an appeal, which means employees remain in 
limbo while their case is decided.64  Scholars have also argued that this 
                                                 
that the complaint either be charged or dismissed.  Id.  A majority of cases are settled once a 
complaint is issued, but the cases that are not settled are scheduled for a formal hearing.  Id. 
at 86.  The General Counsel of the regional office represents the employee and has the burden 
of proof.  MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 87.  The other party then attempts to 
prove its defense.  Id.  At the end of the hearing, the parties are entitled to file briefs for the 
ALJ to review.  Id.  After the ALJ decides, he or she writes a formal Decision and 
Recommendations, which “summarizes the issues, states the facts as the judge finds them, 
discusses applicable provisions of the statute and precedents, and then determines that the 
Act has or has not been violated.”  Id. at 89. 
60 See supra notes 45, 59 and accompanying text (explaining the regional and ALJ review 
process).  “When a case reaches the Board on appeal from an [ALJ’s] decision, the executive 
secretary assigns it to one Board member, who, in turn, assigns it to a legal assistant for 
primary research and analysis.”  MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 90.  Most cases 
are decided by a subpanel of experienced representatives of the three board members 
assigned to the case.  Id.  The three board members review the tentative disposition that the 
experienced representatives made before it becomes final.  Id.  These decisions are then 
circulated to all nonparticipating board members for extra safeguarding.  Id.  If a case is 
difficult or controversial, the full board reviews it during a weekly meeting of all of the NLRB 
members.  Id. 
61 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (stating that the NLRB 
needs three members to have a valid quorum); see also infra Part II.C (showing the facts and 
reasoning of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB). 
62 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116 (“Any party who has been 
aggrieved by an unfair labor practice decision of the Board may appeal to the federal circuit 
courts of appeals.”).  Because the NLRB’s orders are not self-enforcing, more than half of 
unfair labor practice decisions are either appealed to the court of appeals or are taken to the 
courts by the board to seek enforcement.  Id.  The process of appealing to a federal court is 
also very expensive and can cost on average $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants.  
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 
60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010). 
63 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116–17 (stating that approximately 
eighty-five percent of all cases from the NLRB that are appealed to the court of appeals are 
upheld); see also Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1022 (2005) 
(stating that the federal courts are not experts in labor law). 
64 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 118 (“[A]n employee who has been 
discharged illegally, for example, must wait for an additional year after the Board’s decision 
in his favor before he is entitled to reinstatement of his former job and to back pay.”).  This 
timeline could greatly inconvenience and even harm employees who have not been able to 
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judicial review process interferes with the NLRB’s ability to do its job and 
overburdens the courts.65  Overall, the federal courts of appeals helps to 
keep the board from making improper decisions.66  In order to maintain 
this structure, members must be appointed to the NLRB.67 
2. Appointing Members to the NLRB 
The President appoints each of the five members on the NLRB for a 
term of five years.68  The presidential appointment process has two steps.69  
First, the President must nominate a member whom he or she believes is 
qualified to be on the NLRB.70  Then, the Senate must confirm the 
President’s nomination by a supermajority, which consists of a three-fifths 
vote or sixty senators.71  Recently, the Senate invoked the “nuclear 
                                                 
find other jobs.  Id.  In addition, this process could deter parties from asking for a review of 
their case if they need what little back pay they can get now.  Id.  This practice not only delays 
a party from finding a remedy, but also decreases the overall administration of the NLRA.  
Id. 
65 See id. at 116 (arguing that some people believe the judicial review process should not 
be afforded to all parties because it slows down the process and burdens the federal court 
system); see also Introduction:  Reform in the Federal Court System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 685, 685 
(1993) (stating that the federal courts are overburdened and due for a reform). 
66 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116 (explaining the judicial review 
process).  In addition to parties being able to appeal to the federal court, the NLRB also has 
to present its orders to the appellate level court in order for them to be enforced.  Id.  “As a 
practical matter this means that each year approximately 350 to 400 new NLRB cases end up 
in the courts of appeals.”  Id.  Based on other agencies, the NLRB decides more cases which 
are subject to judicial review than any other agency.  Id. 
67 See infra Part II.B.2 (demonstrating how members are appointed to the NLRB). 
68 See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (displaying the policies for nomination to the NLRB).  If a 
member is chosen to fill a vacancy on the Board, his or her term shall last until the end of the 
term of the person who created the vacancy.  Id.  § 153(a).  See also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, 
supra note 30, at 107 (establishing the confirmation process of NLRB members).  This 
appointment power does not give full power to the President or to the Senate because both 
have to agree on a nomination.  See John C. Roberts, The Struggle Over Executive Appointments, 
2014 UTAH L. REV. 725, 726 (2014) (arguing that the appointment power is split by the 
branches of government).  Throughout history the Senate obstructed presidential nominees 
to agencies by filibustering or simply not deciding an appointment.  Id. at 732.  On the other 
hand, recess appointment power gives the President the ability to overcome any tactics the 
Senate uses to stop the appointment.  Id.  This change greatly increased the President’s 
power.  Id. at 735. 
69 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 113 (discussing the two step 
confirmation process).  Although some appointments have been “political,” both the 
management and the labor side are informally contacted by the Secretary of Labor prior to 
an appointment being announced.  Id. 
70 See id. (elaborating on presidential appointments); see also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE 
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 273–80 (2000) (considering whether the Senate can 
condition a President’s choice of nomination by mandating certain qualifications). 
71 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving appointment power to the President).  This 
section states: 
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option[,]” which changed the number of votes needed to confirm an 
appointment from three-fifths to a majority.72  Although the nuclear 
option can make it easier for appointments to be confirmed, there are 
roadblocks, such as political gridlock and Senate inaction, which make 
presidential nominations more difficult.73 
The other method of appointing members to the NLRB is through 
recess appointment power.74  During the period of time from the NLRB’s 
creation in 1935 until the 1980s, the Senate confirmed the presidential 
nominations to the NLRB and recess appointments were never utilized.75  
After Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the Senate began to obstruct NLRB 
appointments by delaying or voting against them.76  This change in 
appointments led Presidents to invoke their recess appointment power 
from the Constitution in order to bypass Senate confirmation.77  This 
                                                 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; 
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the [S]upreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . . 
Id.  See also Orrin G. Hatch, How 52 Senators Made 60=51, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 9, 
12 (2014), https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-law-policy-
review/online/hatch_25_stan_l_poly_rev_online_9.pdf [http://perma.cc/SFE9-PY47] 
(stating that prior to the nuclear option, a three-fifths vote was required for appointment). 
72 See Hatch, supra note 71, at 12 (explaining how the “nuclear option” works); see also 
Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14 (detailing the nuclear option); Z. Byron Wolf, What’s 
the Nuclear Option?, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/21/ 
politics/nuclear-option-explainer/ [http://perma.cc/Z5Y7-UWHP] (describing the nuclear 
option).  The nuclear option was a big change because for the five preceding years the Senate 
blocked confirmation of appointments by filibustering.  See Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra 
note 14 (noting the state of appointments prior to the nuclear option). 
73 See infra Part II.B.2 (commenting how important party alignment is to presidential 
appointment power). 
74 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (illustrating the President’s recess appointment power).  
The clause states that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the 
End of their next Session.”  Id.  Many scholars analyzed the Recess Appointments Clause and 
“argued that the Appointments Clause is inherently political and must be approached with 
its principal purpose in mind—to ensure the smooth and sustained functioning of the 
national government in all its vast and varied fields of responsibility.”  Roberts, supra note 
68, at 732. 
75 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 107 (“[T]he Senate rarely exercises its 
power to challenge the President’s choices for membership on any of the federal regulatory 
agencies.”); see also Roberts, supra note 68, at 732 (stating that after the 1980s the Senate began 
to challenge the President’s nominations to administrative agencies). 
76 Roberts, supra note 68, at 732.  “In a number of cases, minority obstruction was based 
not on doubts about the qualifications or sustainability of the nominee, but on a desire to 
cripple the officer or agency involved.”  Id. at 736. 
77 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing recess appointment power).  “[F]ive of the 
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power allows a President to appoint a member to an agency—which the 
Senate was either delaying or would likely not confirm—during a break 
in Senate activity.78  As a result, Presidents have used the recess 
appointment power 652 times since President Reagan’s administration.79 
Recess appointment power is most important when the NLRB’s 
membership declines and the Senate does not agree on the new member 
the President nominates for appointment.80  In fact, more than fifty percent 
of recess appointments in the past ten years occurred when the Board was 
                                                 
last seven appointments to the NLRB have been recess appointments, as presidents were 
unable to achieve Senate confirmation of their choices.”  Roberts, supra note 68, at 737.  
Around the same time, Senator Richard Shelby stopped all White House nominations for 
executive positions when over seventy nominations were pending.  THOMAS E. MANN & 
NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:  HOW THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 85 (2012). 
78 See David Frisof, Note, Plausible Absurdities and Practical Formalities:  The Recess 
Appointments Clause in Theory and Practice, 112 MICH. L. REV. 627, 631 (2014) (asserting that the 
President may use recess appointments to appoint members whose terms will end at the end 
of the next session).  The goal of recess appointments is to ensure that government offices are 
able to continue functioning without any interruptions.  Roberts, supra note 68, at 744.  Critics 
have taken issue with the ambiguous language in the recess appointment power, which is 
why it is so controversial.  Id. at 745. 
79 Henry Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., The Noel Canning Decision and Recess 
Appointments Made from 1981–2013, at 4 tbl. 1 (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
m020413.pdf [http://perma.cc/G9AQ-PHBE].  When using recess appointment power, 
Presidents typically appoint members belonging to their same political party to the NLRB.  
Compare Hogue et al., supra note 79, at 5–29 tbl. 2–11 (showing the recess appointments each 
president made), and Prints and Photographs Division, Chronological List of Presidents, First 
Ladies, and Vice Presidents of the United States, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D.C., 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/list/057_chron.html [http://perma.cc/X7LG-4Y8Z] 
(providing a list of the presidents and what years they served), with MEMBERS OF THE NLRB 
SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (displaying the political party affiliation of members of the NLRB).  
For example, President Reagan’s recess appointments included five Republican members 
and one Democrat member while President Obama’s recess appointments included four 
Democrat members and one Republican member.  Compare Hogue et al., supra note 79, at 5–
12, 27–28 tbl. 2, 3, 10 (reporting President Reagan’s recess appointments), with MEMBERS OF 
THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (reviewing the political party affiliation of NLRB 
members).  No matter which side a particular President favors, the general consensus 
regarding partisanship appointment prevents the appointment of a majority of either union 
supporters or management supporters.  See Roberts, supra note 68, at 737 (explaining the 
reasons for appointing a member of one’s own political party). 
80 See Roberts, supra note 68, at 737 (noting when the recess appointment power is most 
important).  For example, President Obama had to use the recess appointment power to 
pursue his administration’s labor policies and carry out his statutory abilities when the 
NLRB was down to two members for two years prior to his first term of office.  Id.  See also 
Richard D. Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvit, “Architects of Democracy”:  Labor Organizing as a 
Civil Right, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 225–26 (2013) (arguing that the NLRB’s structure and 
process place it in a vulnerable position to be a target for opponents of workers’ rights). 
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on the verge of falling below the necessary three-member quorum.81  
Overall, this power is most often used to maintain the needed quorum.82 
C. The Quorum Requirement of the NLRB 
The NLRB has the power to delegate the authority of deciding cases 
to a certain group of members on the Board.83  In 2007, the NLRB used its 
own interpretation of this delegation power to its advantage.84  At that 
time, the NLRB only had four members and the terms of two of the 
members were set to expire, which would cause the NLRB to fall below 
the three-member quorum requirement.85  In order to solve the quorum 
problem, the NLRB delegated its authority to three members.86  The NLRB 
reasoned that when the Board was left with two members, there could be 
a quorum because these two members would be a majority of the 
delegated three members—of which only two still remained on the 
                                                 
81 See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (analyzing the members appointed 
to the Board by a recess appointment).  In the NLRB’s history, Presidents have appointed 
twenty-two members using the recess appointment power—seven of which have been in the 
past ten years.  See id. (displaying all of the members on the NLRB and how they were 
appointed). 
82 See id. (identifying the number of times the NLRB’s membership has fallen to two or 
three members and the number of members who have been recess appointed). 
83 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2012) (giving the NLRB the power to delegate authority).  This 
part of the enabling statute states: 
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more 
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise.  The Board 
is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under 
section 159 of this title to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose 
of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and 
determine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an 
election or take a secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 159 
of this title and certify the results thereof. . . . A vacancy in the Board 
shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the 
powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, 
constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall 
constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first 
sentence hereof. 
Id. 
84 See Keith et al., supra note 8 (stating that the NLRB used its delegating authority).  The 
NLRB used its delegation power to get around the three member quorum requirement by 
delegating authority to three members and requiring two of those members to vote in favor 
for a majority.  See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (establishing the NLRB’s delegation power). 
85 See Keith et al., supra note 8 (explaining why the NLRB delegated its authority). 
86 See Matthew D. Moderson, Comment, The National Labor Relations Board After New 
Process Steel:  The Case for Amending Quorum Requirements Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 80 UMKC L. REV. 463, 470 (2011) (commenting on the delegation of authority to three 
members). 
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Board.87  Many parties began to challenge the NLRB’s decisions because 
its enabling statute specified that three members constituted a quorum of 
the five-member board.88  It was not until New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB 
that these decisions were invalidated.89 
In New Process Steel, the NLRB issued two decisions sustaining unfair 
labor practice charges against New Process Steel with a two-member 
board.90  New Process Steel challenged the decision and argued that the 
NLRB did not have enough members to constitute a quorum and that the 
delegation of authority was invalid.91  The Court held that these two 
members did not constitute a quorum because they were not a majority of 
a delegated group, but the only two members of the group.92 
                                                 
87 See id. (displaying the reasoning for delegating authority).  Moderson states: 
Collectively, the Board recognized that a two-member board might not 
satisfy the quorum requirements set forth under Section 3(b) of the 
National Labor Relations Act and thus would lack the authority to 
adjudicate labor disputes until the President appointed a replacement 
Board member.  The Board suggested that such a delay would create 
tremendous headaches for employers and unions seeking to resolve 
disputes. 
Id.  The NLRB relied on the statutory language of Section 3(b) of its enabling act and an 
opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel.  New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 
674, 677 (2010).  The NLRB went on to decide 600 cases with just those two members.  Keith 
et al., supra note 8. 
88 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (displaying the NLRB’s enabling statute). 
89 560 U.S. at 688.  It is important to note that before this decline in membership, the NLRB 
had never lost its quorum for more than two months.  See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, 
supra note 11 (showing that the membership had not declined to less than three members for 
more than a month until the time of New Process Steel). 
90 New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 678.  Other employers made the same challenge that New 
Process Steel did and some circuits held differently in those cases.  See, e.g., Narricot Indus., 
L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 2009) (articulating that a two-member board was 
empowered to issue decisions); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 410, 424 (2d Cir. 
2009) (deciding that the delegation was not against the NLRB’s enabling statute); Laurel Baye 
Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (ruling that 
two members did not constitute a valid quorum in order to decide cases); Ne Land Servs., 
Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the NLRB’s delegation to a panel 
of two members was lawful under the plain text of the NLRA). 
91 New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 678.  The Seventh Circuit decided in favor of the NLRB 
because they reasoned that “the Taft-Hartley Amendment—which increased the Board’s 
membership from three to five members—was to allow the Board to hear more cases” and 
therefore, a court should not make an interpretation that was opposite of this.  Di Vito, supra 
note 21, at 317. 
92 New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 687.  First, the Court stated that it was undisputed that the 
NLRB could delegate its power to a three-member group.  Id. at 680.  The Court then 
interpreted the language of the NLRB’s enabling statute in order to decide whether two of 
the three delegated members constituted a quorum.  Id. at 680–82.  The Court reasoned that 
if Congress wanted two members to constitute a quorum, it would have put a provision in 
the enabling statute.  Id. at 680–83.  In addition, the NLRB’s practice has been to require three 
members to decide cases.  Id. at 683. 
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New Process Steel caused much panic in the labor world and created 
extra work for the NLRB.93  As a result of New Process Steel, around 600 
cases could be appealed.94  In an attempt to remedy this, the NLRB issued 
a press release that stated all administrative decisions were valid; this 
included decisions to add members and ALJs to regional boards.95  Even 
though the press release shielded many cases, the NLRB was still left with 
about 100 cases that could be appealed.96 
D. NLRB v. Canning 
After New Process Steel, the next time the NLRB fell to two members, 
President Obama used his recess appointment power to appoint three 
members to the NLRB:  Sharon Block, Richard Griffin, and Terrence 
Flynn.97  President Obama made these recess appointments because the 
nominations were pending in the Senate, no action was taken, and the 
                                                 
93 See Di Vito, supra note 21, at 329 (noting that this decision affected many cases and it 
solidified the formalistic approach of the Supreme Court).  The decision not only affected 
cases decided by the NLRB, but also other courts.  Id.  Four other circuit courts of appeals 
decided this issue and came to the opposite conclusion, thus, the Supreme Court overturned 
their rulings.  Id. 
94 See id. at 329 (stating that almost 600 cases the NLRB decided will be overturned).  New 
Process Steel will have a greater effect on precedent when administrative agency action is 
interpreted in the future.  Id.  Courts may use this as a model and interpret a statute very 
formally which could take away certain powers from administrative agencies.  Id. 
95 See Office of Public Affairs, New Board Ratifies the General Counsel’s Litigation Authority 
in 2008-09.  Also Ratifies Administrative and Personnel Actions From that Period, NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (July 8, 2010), http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 
09031d4580380dec [http://perma.cc/QY2-4W49] (determining that all administrative and 
personnel decisions are unilaterally ratified).  In addition, the press release stated that the 
general counsel decisions were not affected.  Id.  See also Office of Public Affairs, NLRB 
Outlines Plans for Considering 2-Member Cases in Wake of Supreme Court Ruling, NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (July 1, 2010), http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document. 
aspx/09031d458037e114 [http://perma.cc/5QC5-M88H] (explaining how the NLRB will 
handle the appealed cases). 
96 See Susan J. McGolrick, Board Seeking Remand of About 96 Cases Challenging Validity of 
Two-Member Rulings, 79 U.S.L.W. 1000, 1030 (2010) (stating that each remanded case will be 
considered by a three member panel).  The NLRB reviewed some of those decisions, which 
took away time from its current operations, but most of the case decisions stayed the same.  
See Amanda Becker, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Seen Unlikely to Alter Past NLRB Decisions, 
THOMSON REUTERS (June 26, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-usa-
courts-appointments-nlrb-idUSKBN0F12J820140626 [http://perma.cc/MLP8-YX2F] (‘‘In 
most cases, the new decisions and old decisions were the same, but that wasn’t the case in 
every single case . . . .”). 
97 See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014) (displaying the facts, which led up to 
the Canning dispute). 
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NLRB was about to lose its quorum.98  At the time President Obama made 
these appointments, the Senate was only meeting for pro forma sessions.99 
Noel Canning was one of the many decisions decided by the NLRB 
with the three members President Obama appointed during the Senate’s 
pro forma session in 2013.100  The NLRB did not find in favor of Noel 
Canning and ordered them to make their employees whole for any 
losses.101  Noel Canning requested that the Court of Appeals and the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court set their orders aside, claiming that 
three of the current NLRB members were invalidly appointed.102 
The issue in this case was whether the January 3–6 pro forma sessions 
the Senate held were enough to consider the Senate to be in session.103  The 
Supreme Court analyzed the language of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, and a nine Justice plurality concluded President Obama’s recess 
                                                 
98 See 159 CONG. REC. S16 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2013) (Nominations Returned to the President) 
(showing that Senate members were not confirming nominations to the NLRB). 
99 Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.  See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 246 (discussing the 
actions taken by President Obama which led up to the NLRB v. Canning dispute).  Pro forma 
sessions are brief meetings of the Senate; sometimes only lasting a few minutes.  UNITED 
STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/pro_forma_session. 
htm [https://perma.cc/3UX6-VA5D].  The NLRB then went on to make approximately 800 
decisions with these members.  See Lawrence E. Dubé, Justices Reject NLRB Recess 
Appointments and Mark Constraints on Presidential Power, BNA:  DAILY LABOR REPORT (June 27, 
2014), http://www.bna.com/justices-reject-nlrb-n17179891622/ [http://perma.cc/XQQ5-
4F5N] (stating that the invalidated Board decided about 300 unpublished decisions and 500 
published decisions). 
100 See Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Feb. 8, 2012) (articulating that the NLRB did not 
find in favor of Noel Canning).  The NLRB “found that a Pepsi-Cola distributor, Noel 
Canning, had unlawfully refused to reduce to writing and execute a collective-bargaining 
agreement with a labor union.”  Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557. 
101 Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.  The court also ordered Noel Canning to execute a collective-
bargaining agreement with its employees.  Id. 
102 Id.  Noel Canning’s view was that the Senate meeting on January 3, 2013, terminated 
the recess of the Senate.  Id.  The Court of Appeals ruled that almost all recess appointments 
were invalid.  See Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that Obama’s 
recess appointments were invalid).  The Court of Appeals said that the recess appointment 
must be made within the same intersession recess when the vacancy for that office arose.  Id. 
at 514. 
103 See UNITED STATES SENATE, supra note 99 (defining a pro forma session as a brief meeting 
of the Senate).  At some of these sessions the Senate would only bang the gavel and then 
adjourn.  See Jennifer Steinhauer, Sometimes a Day in Congress Takes Seconds, Gavel to Gavel, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/us/politics/ 
06congress.html [http://perma.cc/364B-LHZH] (stating that a meeting of the Senate lasted 
fifty-nine seconds).  Critics argue that these pro forma sessions were scheduled for the 
purpose of preventing President Obama from recess appointing members.  See Alexander 
Bolton, Senate Schedules Pro-forma Sessions to Block Obama’s Appointments, THE HILL (Dec. 12, 
2011), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/200121-senate-schedules-pro-forma-sessions-
to-block-obamas-recess-appointments [http://perma.cc/AA9K-BH4N] (criticizing that the 
Senate was only trying to block appointments and was not conducting any business). 
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appointments were invalid.104  However, the Court’s reasoning was much 
broader than that of the Court of Appeals.105  The Court determined that 
the length of recess was the most relevant factor in whether the Recess 
Appointments Clause was activated.106  Finally, the Court stated that the 
Senate decides when it is in session as long as it has the capacity to act.107 
Some scholars and critics observed this opinion to be a 
“[c]onstitutional [c]risis” because it “unanimously limited the president’s 
power to make temporary recess appointments when the Senate is not in 
session.”108  However, there is also an argument that the Court could have 
limited the recess appointment power more than it chose to.109  In 
addition, those who were in favor of the Senate thought the regulation 
was much needed.110 
                                                 
104 See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (concluding that the Senate needed to have a recess for at 
least ten days in order for the recess appointments to be valid). 
105 See id. at 2567 (upholding recess appointment power, but limiting its use by various 
requirements); Charlie Savage, Between the Lines of the Recess Appointments Decision, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/25/us/annotated-
supreme-court-recess-decision.html [http://perma.cc/D5J5-DFEA] (“While on the surface 
the ruling was a blow to executive power, on a deeper level it was also a victory for executive 
power because it rolled back an appeals court ruling that had gone much further in 
restricting such authority.”). 
106 See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567 (“If a Senate recess is so short that it does not require the 
consent of the House, it is too short to trigger the Recess Appointments Clause . . . [a]nd a 
recess lasting less than 10 days is presumptively too short as well.”).  In addition, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the language “all vacancies” in the Recess Appointments Clause 
to include both vacancies that occur during a recess of the Senate and those that occur while 
the Senate is in session.  Id. at 2573.  By broadly interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause, 
the Court chose not to distinguish between intersession recess appointments and 
intrasession recess appointments because they stated that “the recess” applied to both.  Id. at 
2567. 
107 See id. at 2574 (leading to the conclusion that the pro forma sessions signified the Senate 
being in session).  In addition to the majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote a concurring 
opinion in which he argued that the Recess Appointments Clause only applied to breaks in 
between sessions.  Id. at 2595 (Scalia, J., concurring).  He also argued that the Recess 
Appointments Clause only applied to vacancies, which happen while the Senate is in recess.  
Id. at 2617.  All in all, Scalia stated that the majority “replaces the Constitution’s text with a 
new set of judge-made rules to govern recess appointments.”  Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2617. 
108 Pema Levy, Did the Supreme Court Just Set Up a Constitutional Crisis?, NEWSWEEK (June 
27, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/did-supreme-court-just-set-constitutional-crisis-
256461 [http://perma.cc/TX9J-A9U8].  If the President does not control both houses of 
Congress he might not be able to make appointments.  Id.  See also Jeff Shesol, Did History 
Win in Noel Canning, THE NEW YORKER (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/06/supreme-court-recess-
appointments-power-noel-canning.html [http://perma.cc/PW9K-ECF6] (arguing that this 
provision gives the Senate the power to avoid confirming presidential appointments 
indefinitely). 
109 See Savage, supra note 105 (stating that the Supreme Court “rolled back” on how far the 
Court of Appeals had gone). 
110 See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Court Ruling Upsets Conventional Wisdom On Recess 
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Many critics also realized that this decision could invalidate an 
abundance of cases.111  Some critics argued that every case needed to be 
reanalyzed, while others argued that it is likely the NLRB will rubber 
stamp them resulting in no major policy changes.112  Regardless of the side 
the critics supported, everyone maintained that the decision created a lot 
of work for the NLRB because the agency would need to reanalyze cases 
and make up for the time when the Board did not have a quorum.113 
E. The Aftermath of NLRB v. Canning 
After the invalidation of President Obama’s recess appointments, the 
Court required those members to vacate the Board.114  This decision left 
three open positions on the NLRB.115  On July 30, 2013, the Senate 
confirmed a new board that included two old members and three new 
members.116  Each of these members have varying experiences and 
                                                 
Appointments, NPR (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/01/25/ 
170293179/court-ruling-upsets-conventional-wisdom-on-recess-appointments 
[http://perma.cc/VNL6-Y8JJ] (“Allowing the President to define the scope of his own 
appointments power would eviscerate the Constitution’s separation of powers . . . .”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
111 See Keith et al., supra note 8 (commenting that all Board decisions between January 2012 
and August 2013 are void); see also Dubé, supra note 99 (demonstrating that the impact of 
NLRB v. Canning will be significant); G. Roger King & Bryan J. Leitch, The Impact of the 
Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision—Years of Litigation Challenges on the Horizon for the 
NLRB, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 27, 2014), http://www.bna.com/impact-supreme-courts-
n17179891624 [http://perma.cc/QHT4-58AH] (explaining the amount of cases which could 
be overturned both on the regional and national level). 
112 Compare Labor Board Scrambles After Hundreds of Decisions Thrown into Doubt By Court 
Ruling, FOX NEWS (June 27, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/06/27/labor-
board-scrambles-after-hundreds-decisions-thrown-into-doubt-by-court/ 
[http://perma.cc/GP6-EKNU] (arguing that each case needs to be presented before the 
Board), with Dubé, supra note 99 (stating that some parties might not even appeal). 
113 See Keith et al., supra note 8 (discussing the amount of decisions the board might have 
to reexamine); see also Dubé, supra note 99 (articulating that the NLRB has a large amount of 
cases to reconsider); King & Leitch, supra note 111 (analyzing that the resolving of these cases 
could take years). 
114 See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014) (holding that the Recess 
Appointments Clause did not give President Obama the constitutional authority to make the 
appointments at issue); see also Mark L. Shapiro et al., United States:  The Supreme Court’s Noel 
Canning Decisions and the NLRB’s Response, MONDAQ (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/328048/employee+rights+labour+relations/Th
e+Supreme+Courts+Noel+Canning+Decision+and+the+NLRBs+Response 
[http://perma.cc/6U6P-B7MH] (advocating that the NLRB needs to act fast on the cases in 
order to make room for new issues). 
115 See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (showing how many members 
were on the Board at a time). 
116 Harold P. Coxson, Senate Confirms New Five-Member NLRB:  What Just Happened and 
What’s Next?, OGLETREE DEAKINS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/senate-
confirms-new-five-member-nlrb-what-just-happened-and-whats-next/ [http://perma.cc/ 
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political views that play a role in the way the NLRB makes decisions.117  
The views of the members are important because the NLRB has two 
different sides it could take in almost every case—the employee or the 
management.118  These members’ terms will end at varying times starting 
in December 2014; this will be significant because the difference in party 
alignment during the next term could create a gridlock.119  In addition, 
while the new NLRB was trying to patch the damage from NLRB v. 
Canning, the Senate was constructing a new enabling statute for the 
NLRB.120  In general, this new board, consisting of three Democrats—one 
                                                 
576H-SDPR].  The two members who were not invalidated were:  Mark Gaston Pearce and 
Philip A. Miscimarra.  Id.  Mark Pearce has been the chairman of the NLRB since August 27, 
2011.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE BOARD:  MARK GASTON PEARCE, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/mark-gaston-pearce [http://perma.cc/4Q3M-
K8VJ].  Prior to being on the Board, he was a founding partner at a law firm in Buffalo, New 
York where he practiced union and plaintiff side labor and employment law.  Id.  Philip A. 
Miscimarra became a Board member on August 7, 2013.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, THE BOARD:  PHILIP A. MISCIMARRA, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/board/philip-miscimarra [http://perma.cc/3TWW-N9H9].  Prior to being a NLRB 
member, he was a labor and employment law partner at a Chicago law firm.  Id.  He wrote 
many books on labor law issues, including some on the NLRB.  Id. 
117 See Coxson, supra note 116 (summarizing the positions of the board members).  The 
Senate confirmed three new members to the Board on July 30, 2013:  Nancy Schiffer, Harry 
I. Johnson, III, and Kent Hirozawa.  Id.  Nancy Schiffer is a Democrat who was previously 
the associate general counsel with the AFL-CIO.  Id.  She has been involved in all aspects of 
NLRA practice and procedure and has even been a part of the NLRB previously as a field 
attorney at the Detroit Regional Office.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE BOARD:  
NANCY J. SCHIFFER, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/nancy-j-schiffer 
[http://perma.cc/6K6E-9THR].  Next, Harry I. Johnson, III is a Republican who previously 
practiced at a management-side law firm in Los Angeles.  See Coxson, supra note 116 
(describing Mr. Johnson’s previous positions).  He previously worked at Jones Day for a 
sixteen year period.  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE BOARD:  HARRY I. JOHNSON, 
III, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/harry-i-johnson-iii [http://perma.cc/ 
NZ43-S7J6].  Last, Kent Hirozawa, prior to being appointed to the Board, was chief counsel 
to Board Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce.  Coxson, supra note 116.  Before this, he worked as 
a union lawyer for most of his career at a New York law firm.  Id.; NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD, THE BOARD:  KENT Y. HIROZAWA, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/board/kent-y-hirozawa [http://perma.cc/H6MB-U9XS]. 
118 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 72–76 (stating that one side must be 
chosen and critics of one side will probably disagree).  Union and workers’ rights supporters 
typically take the employee’s side.  Id.  Upper level management and executives typically 
take the management’s side.  Id. 
119 See Scott Flaherty, With Election Win, GOP To Push Legislation To Rein In NLRB, LAW360 
(Nov. 5, 2014, 12:52 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/590910/with-election-win-gop-
to-push-legislation-to-rein-in-nlrb [http://perma.cc/S6XZ-37QV] (opining that Republicans 
may have the votes to block nominees); see also Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (“There is also 
the political question of what happens next time there is a vacancy on the board and opposite 
parties control the White House and the Senate.”). 
120 See infra Part II.E.2 (explaining the Senate’s proposed bill to reform the NLRB’s enabling 
statute). 
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of them being the chair of the board—and two Republicans, had a 
significant amount of work to do to get the NLRB caught up on 
everything.121 
The NLRB’s actions can be split into two parts:  the NLRB’s Reaction, 
and the Senate’s Proposed Bill.122  Part II.E.1 discusses the NLRB’s action 
thus far.123  Part II.E.2 introduces the Senate’s new proposed bill and all of 
the provisions that pertain to the national office of the NLRB, including a 
new funding requirement.124 
1. The NLRB’s Reaction 
The new board reacted quickly after the Supreme Court rendered its 
decision in NLRB v. Canning.125  In less than a month after the Court issued 
its decision, the NLRB delivered a press release confirming all regional 
appointments and regional decisions.126  In addition, the President and 
                                                 
121 See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, BOARD MEMBERS SINCE 1935, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935 [http://perma.cc/Z3EV-
L9UK] (displaying the makeup of members to the NLRB and their political affiliation); see 
also Dubé, supra note 99 (arguing that these cases will have a big impact on the NLRB’s 
operation); King & Leitch, supra note 111 (commenting on the amount of cases the NLRB 
may have to reexamine); Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (explaining that many high profile and 
controversial decisions were invalidated).  The trust in the NLRB was also at issue because 
many cases could be appealed.  See William McQuillen, NLRB Chief Says Lapses By Flynn Raise 
Questions of Trust, BLOOMBERG (May 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-
03/nrlb-chief-says-lapses-by-flynn-raise-questions-of-trust.html [http://perma.cc/NRL6-
HNLF] (noting that there have been questions of trust in the NLRB). 
122 See infra Part II.E.1 (showing the NLRB’s action since NLRB v. Canning); see also infra 
Part II.E.2 (explaining the Senate’s proposed bill). 
123 See infra Part II.E.1 (reviewing the NLRB’s actions thus far). 
124 See infra Part II.E.2 (outlining each section of the Senate’s bill). 
125 NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014).  See Benjamin Goad, NLRB Ratifies Actions 
of Unconstitutional Board, THE HILL (Aug. 8, 2014), http://thehill.com/regulation/labor/ 
214239-nlrb-ratifies-actions-taken-by-unconstitutional-labor-board [http://perma.cc/R948-
38TJ] (repeating the NLRB’s message from its press release).  Because of the press release, 
the NLRB will have fewer issues that could possibly be reexamined.  Id. 
126 See Office of Public Affairs, NLRB Officials Ratify Agency Actions Taken During Period 
When Supreme Court Held Board Members Were Not Validly Appointed, NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-
officials-ratify-agency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court [http://perma. 
cc/XP83-FMCS] (stating that the NLRB “unanimously ratified all administrative, personnel, 
and procurement matters taken by the NLRB from January 4, 2012 to August 5, 2013”).  This 
press release allowed the NLRB to ensure that actions taken by the regional members 
appointed during the time of invalidation could not be appealed.  See Barbara E. Hoey & 
Mark A. Konkel, NLRB Ratifies All Administrative Actions Taken by the Board During “Noel 
Canning” Period, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail. 
aspx?g=f2680f40-69d1-4254-b694-d49682f99c2e [http://perma.cc/JCW8-TYXK] (referring to 
the appointment of three regional directors, many ALJs, and the restructuring of offices and 
departments).  The time of invalidation refers to the time when the invalidated members 
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Senate agreed on who replaced Nancy Schiffer when her term was up in 
December 2014.127  Confirming these officials’ actions and appointing a 
replacement for Schiffer were only two of the many tasks the NLRB 
checked off its list.128 
Although the new board avoided reexamination of many regional 
cases because of the press release confirming all regional directors, there 
are still around 100 cases the NLRB may be required to revisit with the 
new valid members.129  In order for these cases to be re-decided, one of the 
parties has to request an appeal from a U.S. Court of Appeals.130  
Specifically, seven cases that may be appealed would have a large effect 
on labor and employment law.131  If the rulings of these cases change, it 
                                                 
were a part of the Board. 
127 See Ramsey Cox, Senate Dems Confirm NLRB Nominee Before GOP Take Over, THE HILL 
BLOG (Dec. 8, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/226369-senate-
dems-confirm-nlrb-nominee-before-gop-take-over [http://perma.cc/SST6-XY58] 
[hereinafter Cox, Senate Dems Confirm] (stating that Lauren McGarity McFerran was 
confirmed by a 54–40 vote in the Senate).  McFerran was a former member of the Senate 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee and “will be a great asset to the board.”  
Id.  This was an important advancement for the NLRB because without a replacement for 
Schiffer, there would have been a two-two split between Republican and Democrat 
members.  See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (displaying the makeup of 
members to the NLRB and their political affiliation); see also Carolyn Phenicie, GOP Strategy 
on Labor Issues Remains Hazy, ROLL CALL (Dec. 3, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/ 
news/gop_strategy_on_labor_issues_remains_hazy-238378-1.html [http://perma.cc/ 
Y28U-69XV] (recognizing that even numbers of Republicans and Democrats can cause 
gridlock). 
128 Benjamin Goad, Workload Threatens to Paralyze Labor Board, THE HILL (July 13, 2014), 
http://thehill.com/regulation/labor/212031-new-workload-threatens-to-paralyze-obama-
labor-board [http://perma.cc/C24F-S788].  If the NLRB had not ratified the appointment of 
all of these regional directors and ALJs, the new board would have had hundreds of cases to 
reexamine because it would not only need to reexamine the cases the national board decided, 
but also would have to tend to the regional cases that never reached the national level.  See 
id. (“[T]he ruling could throw into question more than 400 cases from the period between 
January 2012, when the appointments were made, and August 2013, when the Senate 
approved new board members.”).  In addition to cases being re-decided, there are new cases 
which caused more media attention to be focused on the NLRB.  See Kate Taylor, Franchise 
Industry Strikes Back at NLRB’s “Joint Employer” Decision, ENTREPRENEUR BLOG (Sept. 23, 
2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237759 [http://perma.cc/K62A-2F8J] 
(mentioning that some cases the NLRB is deciding will have great economic effect); Erik 
Wemple, NLRB Rules Against CNN Over 2003 Reorganization, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2014/09/15/nlrb-rules-
against-cnn-over-2003-reorganization/ [http://perma.cc/LRA5-CSAP] (focusing attention 
on the NLRB’s recent decisions). 
129 See Hoey & Konkel, supra note 126 (stating that the NLRB will still have to revisit the 
100 cases which were invalidated).  
130 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012) (explaining the appeals process of a final order from the 
NLRB). 
131 See Jeffrey D. Polsky, United States:  9 Key NLRB Decisions Invalidated by the Supreme 
Court’s Noel Canning Decision, MONDAQ (July 1, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/ 
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would drastically affect how employees, employers, and unions operate 
on a daily basis.132  These seven cases can be separated into three different 
categories:  (1) employee policy; (2) union representation; and (3) old 
precedent.133 
The employee policy category is comprised of three cases prohibiting 
employee discussion in some manner.134  Employee policy governs what 
                                                 
unitedstates/x/324276/employee+rights+labour+relations/9+Key+NLRB+Decisions+Inva
lidated+by+the+Supreme+Courts+Noel+Canning+Decision [http://perma.cc/TF9-X53S] 
(summarizing nine cases that are important to track in the upcoming months).  This Note 
addresses seven of the nine cases that fit into the three specific categories. 
132 See infra Part III.A (showing what changes would occur if these cases are appealed). 
133 See Polsky, supra note 131 (considering certain cases that would have a greater impact 
than most other cases).  Employee policy is comprised of Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc. 
and Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Costco Wholesale Corporation.  Hispanics United of Buffalo, 
Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15656 at *4 (Dec. 14, 2012); Fresenius 
USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *8 (Sept. 19, 2012); 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15602 at *16 
(Sept. 7, 2012).  Union representation is comprised of Alan Ritchey, Inc. and Banner Health 
System.  Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *10 
(Dec. 14, 2012); Banner Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15598 at *2 
(July 30, 2012).  Old precedent is comprised of Piedmont Gardens and WKTC-TV, Inc.  
Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 15, 
2012); WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15653 at *8 (Dec. 12, 
2012). 
134 See Polsky, supra note 131 (displaying the synopsis of the seven cases); see also NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/employee-rights [http://perma.cc/K5PH-48KH] (describing the employee rights 
that the NLRB protects).  Cases that fit into this category include Hispanics United of Buffalo, 
Inc., Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc., and Costco Wholesale Corporation.  See Hispanics 
United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15656 at *1–2, 4 
(Dec. 14, 2012) (discussing that discharging employees for Facebook comments written in 
response to a coworker’s criticisms of their job performance violated the NLRA); see also 
Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *8 (Sept. 19, 
2012) (asserting that an employee may not be suspended and discharged for posting vulgar, 
offensive, and possibly threatening statements on union newsletters and leaving them in the 
breakroom); Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 
15602 at *16 (Sept. 7, 2012) (holding that Costco violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by 
maintaining rules prohibiting posting, distributing, removing, or altering materials on 
company property, prohibiting discussing private matters of others including sick calls, 
Family and Medical Leave Act call-outs, Americans with Disabilities Act accommodations, 
sensitive information such as payroll, and confidential information such as phone numbers 
and addresses).   
In Hispanics United of Buffalo, an employee posted a discriminatory statement about 
another employee on Facebook and four other employees commented on it.  Hispanics 
United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15656 at *1–2 (Dec. 
14, 2012).  Hispanics United of Buffalo discharged all five employees for this act.  Id. at *2.  
The NLRB ruled that discharging the employees was a violation of the NLRA because the 
criticisms were undertaken for “mutual aid or protection” as required by Section 7 of the 
NLRA, which meant it was concerted activity.  Id. 
In Fresenius USA Manufacturing, female employees complained about vulgar, offensive, 
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an employee can and cannot do.135  These three cases deal with employees 
who made comments about an employer, another employee, or union.136  
This type of activity is important for employees to be able to organize and 
express their opinions by utilizing protected concerted activity.137  The risk 
in this category of cases being reexamined is that change could cause 
employees’ jobs to be in jeopardy and unfair labor standards to be 
imposed.138 
Next, the union representation category involves cases that discuss 
the rights of the collective bargaining agreements.139  Union representation 
                                                 
and threatening statements on union newsletters.  Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 
2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *1–2 (Sept. 19, 2012).  Fresenius investigated the 
statements, questioned the employee, and as a result of the confirmation of the employee 
being responsible, suspended and discharged that employee.  Id.  The NLRB ruled that the 
questioning and investigation was proper, but that the suspension and discharge was not 
because his comments were classified as protected union activity.  Id. at *8. 
In Costco Wholesale Corporation, an employee of Costco attempted to get others to 
unionize by passing out material and discussing it with other employees.  Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15602 at *6 (Sept. 7, 2012).  The 
NLRB ruled this to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA and ordered Costco to cease 
and desist from this activity and reform its employee agreement.  Id. at *16–17. 
135 See Polsky, supra note 131 (displaying the seven cases analyzed); see also supra note 134 
and accompanying text (analyzing the employee policy category).  In all of these cases, the 
NLRB decided in favor of the employee.  Supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
136 See Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 
15656 at *1–2 (Dec. 14, 2012) (discharging employees for making comments online about 
another worker); see also Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. 
(CCH) ¶ 15622 at *1–2, 8 (Sept. 19, 2012) (analyzing whether an employee writing comments 
on a newsletter can be disciplined); Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 
NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15602 at *6 (Sept. 7, 2012) (discussing an employee making comments 
about a union). 
137 See NLRB, Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD 2–5, http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-
3024/basicguide.pdf [http://perma.cc/HPP4-AXHQ] [hereinafter Basic Guide] (explaining 
Section 7 of the NLRA regarding concerted activity).  See also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, 
supra note 30, at 16–20 (describing the NLRA and its purpose).  “A better relationship 
between labor and management is the high purpose of this act.  By assuring the employees 
the right of collective bargaining it fosters the development of the employment contract on a 
sound and equitable basis.”  Id. 
138 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (showing the facts of each case and explaining 
the consequence to employees and employers).  In fact, on June 24, 2015, the NLRB 
considered de novo the invalidated decision of Fresenius USA Manufacturing, and it found that 
the investigation, suspension, and discharge were all lawful.  Fresenius USA Mfg., 362 
N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *2−3 (June 24, 2015).  This is contrary to the NLRB’s 
first decision in Fresenius USA Manufacturing where it stated the suspension and discharge 
of the employee was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA.  Fresenius USA Mfg., 
358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *8 (Sept. 19, 2012). 
139 See Polsky, supra note 131 (displaying the synopsis of the seven cases).  The cases in this 
category consist of Alan Ritchey, Inc. and Banner Health System.  See Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *10 (Dec. 14, 2012) (ruling that 
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allows employees to organize and protect their rights.140  Section 8 of the 
NLRA addresses collective bargaining and the representation of 
employees, which is important because, without it, employers could 
unduly influence employees by making agreements that are favorable to 
the employer.141  These cases represent the right of an employee to receive 
the aid of a union prior to being discharged.142  If either of these decisions 
are changed on reexamination, employees would be wary about 
consulting unions during investigations that would endanger their 
employment rights.143  In addition, employers might put less effort into 
investigations if they knew they could discharge employees without 
questioning from a union.144  Overall, this loophole could defeat the 
essence of the collective bargaining agreement.145 
Finally the last category, old precedent, deals with cases which 
overturn longstanding labor and employment law precedent.146  Old 
                                                 
discretionary discipline is a mandatory subject of bargaining and that employers may not 
impose discipline unilaterally); Banner Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. 
(CCH) ¶ 15598 at *2 (July 30, 2012) (holding that a rule that an employee could not discuss 
ongoing investigations of employee misconduct was against Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA). 
 In Alan Ritchey, Inc., two employees with nine unexcused absences were each given 
verbal warnings and a written warning.  Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 
NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *3 (Dec. 14, 2012).  The company evaluated each situation and 
discharged what it believed to be the appropriate employees.  Id.  The NLRB examined the 
policy and ruled that the company should have contacted the union before it imposed any 
discretionary discipline even though the parties had not signed their contract with the union 
yet.  Id. at *10.  In Banner Health, the human resources director disciplined the employee and 
asked the employee not to discuss the matter with coworkers during the ongoing 
investigation.  Banner Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15598 at *1 
(July 30, 2012).  The NLRB held that this was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 
because the employer did not show that it had a legitimate interest that outweighed the 
employee’s Section 7 rights.  Id. at *2. 
140 See Chris Langford, Why Collective Bargaining Rights are Important, INT’L FEDERATION OF 
PROF’L & TECHNICAL ENG’RS (June 13, 2012), http://www.ifpte.org/news/details/Why-
Collective-Bargaining-Rights-Are-Important [http://perma.cc/J57R-8VMS] (explaining the 
importance of union representation). 
141 See Basic Guide, supra note 137, at 6–13 (discussing the requirements of collective 
bargaining). 
142 See Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *10 
(Dec. 14, 2012) (regarding consulting a union prior to discretionary discipline); Banner 
Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15598 at *2 (July 30, 2012) (allowing 
an employee to discuss an ongoing investigation). 
143 See Basic Guide, supra note 137, at 6–13 (explaining the rights of employees to have a 
relationship with a union).  In fact, on June 26, 2015, the NLRB affirmed the previous vacated 
opinion in Banner Health.  Banner Health, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 2015 WL 4179691, at *1 (June 
26, 2015). 
144 See supra Part II.A (describing the history of the NLRA and why it was created). 
145 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (guaranteeing employees the right to collectively bargain). 
146 See Polsky, supra note 131 (depicting the cases which could affect old precedent).  Two 
important decisions in this category are Piedmont Gardens and WKTC-TV, Inc.  See Piedmont 
Littlejohn: NLRB v. Canning Featuring the All-Powerful Senate:  The National
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
298 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
precedent provides employers, employees, and unions a guide for future 
policies and disputes.147  Specifically, both of the cases in this category 
involve union representation and an employer making a decision without 
union consultation.148  If these rulings changed on reexamination, 
employers would believe that they could consult the union less in 
decisionmaking.149  Old precedent cases are important because they serve 
as reminders that the NLRA created the NLRB and the NLRA must be 
                                                 
Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 15, 2012) 
(overruling a fifty-five year precedent and stating that an employer violated the NLRA by 
failing to provide the witnesses’ names and job titles); WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 
2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15653 at *8 (Dec. 12, 2012) (overruling an old precedent and 
stating that an employer, at the expiration of a union contract, must continue to honor a dues 
checkoff arrangement until the employee and employer can reach an agreement or a valid 
“impasse” permits unilateral modification by the employer). 
In Piedmont Gardens, a nurse observed another nurse sleeping on the job, but the nurse 
who observed the conduct did not report it; an assistant reported it.  Piedmont Gardens, 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *1–2 (Dec. 15, 2012).  After the 
observing nurse found out that someone else reported the incident, she wrote a statement 
reporting the conduct.  Id. at *2.  After, both the observing nurse and the assistant were asked 
to compile another statement of the incident and after examining the statements, the sleeping 
nurse was fired.  Id.  The union requested the documents in the investigation, but the 
employer refused to turn them over.  Id.  The NLRB held that when the union asked for the 
statements, the employer was required to turn them over because not turning them over  
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA.  Id. at *5–6. 
 In WKTC-TV, Inc., the employee and employer were parties to multiple collective 
bargaining agreements.  WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 
15653 at *1 (Dec. 12, 2012).  In the most recent collective bargaining agreement there was a 
“dues checkoff[,]” which is when the employer takes the union dues out of a paycheck 
automatically.  Id. at *1–2.  The current agreement ended and a new agreement was being 
negotiated.  Id.  In the meantime, the employer stopped collecting the dues without 
consulting the union.  Id.  The NLRB ruled this action to be against Section 8(a)(5) of the 
NLRA and that the employer should have honored the dues checkoff arrangements post-
contract expiration.  Id. at *8. 
147 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987) (explaining the 
importance of precedent).  Schauer opined that: 
An argument from precedent seems at first to look backward.  The 
traditional perspective on precedent . . . has therefore focused on the use 
of yesterday’s precedents in today’s decisions.  But in an equally if not 
more important way, an argument from precedent looks forward as 
well, asking us to view today’s decision as a precedent for tomorrow’s 
decisionmakers.  Today is not only yesterday’s tomorrow; it is also 
tomorrow’s yesterday. 
Id. 
148 Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 
15, 2012); WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15653 at *2 (Dec. 
12, 2012).  If these cases are appealed, union membership could decline and more employees 
could be fired without just cause.  See supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing the 
facts of each case). 
149 See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (explaining that never consulting with a union can be an unfair 
labor practice). 
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followed.150  Overall, the three categories of cases encompass some of the 
most important issues in the realm of labor and employment law.151 
2. The Senate’s Proposed Bill 
The Senate suggested its own solution to the NLRB’s problems.152  On 
September 16, 2014, the Republican leaders in the Senate proposed a bill 
to amend the NLRA to reform the NLRB.153  The bill, which is called the 
National Labor Relations Board Reform Act (“the Bill”), proposes a new 
structure, appointment procedure, and requirements for both a quorum 
and funding.154 
The new structure the Bill proposes is to change the Board to six-
members with three Democrats and three Republicans.155  These members 
                                                 
150 See Basic Guide, supra note 137, at 6–13 (showing the requirements an employer must 
follow).  In fact, on June 26, 2015, the NLRB affirmed the previous vacated opinion in 
Piedmont Gardens.  Piedmont Gardens, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 2015 WL 4179692, at *8 (June 26, 
2015). 
151 See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (displaying the unfair labor practices). 
152 See Brian Mahoney, GOP Senators Unveil National Labor Relations Board Overhaul, 
POLITICO (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/national-labor-
relations-board-members-111010.html [http://perma.cc/N42A-UMLB] (asserting that the 
NLRB Reform Act will “change the NLRB from an advocate to an umpire”); see also Ramsey 
Cox, McConnell Pushes NLRB Reforms, THE HILL BLOG (Sept. 16, 2014, 10:45 AM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/217832-mcconnell-pushes-nlrb-reforms 
[http://perma.cc/4NHD-NVKU] (providing that this would “take the politics out of it”).  
But see Thomas E. Mann, Admit It, Political Scientists:  Politics Really Is More Broken Than Ever, 
THE ATLANTIC (May 26, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/ 
dysfunction/371544/ [http://perma.cc/9FTG-9K4L] (reporting that politics are more 
broken than ever and everything is becoming dysfunctional); see also Aaron Blake, Gridlock 
in Congress?  It’s Probably Even Worse Than You Think, WASH. POST (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/05/29/gridlock-in-congress-
its-probably-even-worse-than-you-think/ [http://perma.cc/3VAC-NLXA] (explaining that 
gridlock has more than doubled since the 1950s). 
153 S. 2814, 113th Cong. (2014).  See Eleanor Vaida Gerhards, United States:  In Wake of 
McDonald’s, GOP Senate Proposes Bill to Restructure National Labor Relations Board, MONDAQ 
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/341246/employee+rights+ 
labour+relations/In+Wake+of+McDonalds+GOP+Senate+Proposes+Bill+to+Restructure+
National+Labor+Relations+Board [http://perma.cc/P3QJ-GCND] (discussing the Senate’s 
proposed new structure to the NLRB). 
154 S. 2814, 113th Cong.  The bill is modeled off of the Federal Election Commission, which 
is known to be one of the most ineffective independent agencies.  See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)–
(2)(B) (2012) (reviewing the Federal Election Commission’s structure); Michael M. Franz, The 
Devil We Know?  Evaluating the Federal Election Commission as Enforcer, 8 ELECTION L.J. 167, 167 
(2009) (stating that the Federal Election Commission is one of the most ineffective agencies 
and Congress designed it to be slow and ineffective). 
155 S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a).  This section states that it will amend 29 U.S.C. § 153(a): 
[B]y striking “five instead of three members” and inserting “6 instead of 
5 members”; and . . . by striking “appointed by the President by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate” and inserting “appointed 
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would be “appointed by the President, after consultation with the leader 
of the Senate representing the party opposing the party of the President, 
by and with the consent of the Senate.”156  In addition, two members’ 
terms would end at the same time, one being Republican and the other 
being Democrat.157 
Next, the Bill proposes new requirements.158  One of those 
requirements is to change the quorum requirement from three to four 
members.159  In addition, there must be a balance of Republicans and 
Democrats in the quorum, which means there has to be at least two 
Republicans and two Democrats in favor of the holding in each case.160  
The other new requirements address funding of the NLRB.161  First, there 
                                                 
by the President, after consultation with the leader of the Senate 
representing the party opposing the party of the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate . . . .” 
Id. § 2(a)(1)(B)–(C).  It also adds that “[o]f the 6 members, there shall be 3 members 
representing each of the 2 major political parties . . . .]”  Id. § 2(a)(2). 
156 Id. § 2(a)(1)(C). 
157 See id. § 2(a)(2) (requiring two members of opposite political parties to have terms 
ending on the same date). 
158 See id. § 2 (establishing new requirements for the NLRB). 
159 S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(b).  This section amends 29 U.S.C. § 153(b): 
[B]y striking “three or more” and inserting “4 or more”; . . . by inserting 
before the period following:  “, with such group consisting of an equal 
number of members representing each major political party”; . . . by 
striking “three members” and inserting “4 members”; and . . . by 
striking “Board, except that” and all that follows through “hereof.” And 
inserting the following:  “Board.  Any determination of the Board shall 
be approved by majority of the members present.” 
Id. § 2(b)(1). 
160 See id. § 2(b)(1)(B) (commenting that a quorum shall consist of “an equal number of 
members representing each major political party”).  This means that two members will have 
to vote against party lines to make a decision.  See Dave Jamieson, Republican Proposal for 
Labor Law Reform “A Disgrace,” Says Labor Leader, HUFF. POST (Sept. 18, 2014, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/labor-law-reform_n_5838922.html 
[http://perma.cc/57H2-6K3U] (discussing that there must be an even amount of political 
parties to have a vote). 
161 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20 (creating funding requirements for the NLRB).  This section 
would add the following to 29 U.S.C. § 153: 
If, 2 years after the date of the enactment the National Labor Relations 
Board Reform Act, the Board has failed to issue a final order, in 
accordance with section 10(d), on more than 90 percent of the cases 
pending on (or filed on or after) such date of enactment, then the amount 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act for each of the 
succeeding 2 fiscal years shall be 80 percent of the average amount so 
authorized for the prior 2 fiscal years. . . .  If, 4 years after the date of the 
enactment of the National Labor Relations Board Reform Act, the Board 
has failed to issue a final order, in accordance with section 10(d), on 
more than 90 percent of the cases pending on (or filed on or after) the 
date that is 2 years after the date of such enactment, then the amount 
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is a two-year deadline that proposes within the first two years after the 
Bill’s enactment if the NLRB fails to come to a final order in ninety percent 
or more of its cases, the NLRB will lose twenty percent of its funding.162  
Next, there is a four-year deadline that lengthens the two-year 
requirement.163  The Bill states that if the NLRB has not decided ninety 
percent or more of its cases within the first four years of the Bill’s 
enactment, then the NLRB shall keep the twenty percent budget reduction 
for each succeeding year.164  Overall, the Bill could change the NLRB’s 
entire structure.165 
F. The Federal Communications Commission 
If the NLRB changes its structure or enabling statute in the future, it 
could use other independent agencies as a guide.166  Many other 
independent agencies have similar structures to the NLRB, such as the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).167  The FCC is similar to 
the NLRB in the way that it operates.168 
                                                 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act for each succeeding 
fiscal year shall remain the amount so appropriated for the fiscal year 
that is 4 years after the date of such enactment. 
Id. § 20(a)–(b). 
162 Id. § 20(a).  There was a house bill in 2011, which also called for a funding decrease, but 
the bill did not pass.  See H.R. 1, 112th Cong. (2011) (asking for an eighteen percent decrease 
in the NLRB’s budget); see also Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 80, at 225−26 n.67 (describing 
two House bills that attempted to decrease the funding of the NLRB). 
163 S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20(a)–(b). 
164 Id. 
165 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the Senate’s bill). 
166 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (allowing Commodity Future’s Trading Commission 
members to continue their term until another member is appointed); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) 
(permitting a Federal Trade Commission member’s term to extend until another member is 
appointed); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(b) (2012) (establishing that a Consumer Product Safety 
Commission member’s term may extend until another member is appointed except that it is 
not to extend more than a year from the original end of their term); 19 U.S.C. § 1330(b)(2) 
(2012) (permitting an International Trade Commission member’s term to extend until 
another member is appointed); 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012) (stating that a Federal 
Communications Commission member’s term shall continue until another member is 
appointed or until the end of the next congressional session); 49 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012) 
(expanding that a National Transportation Safety Board’s member may serve until another 
member is appointed); see also Kali Borkoski, Political Consequences of NLRB v. Noel Canning, 
SCOTUS BLOG (July 15, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/political-
consequences-of-nlrb-v-noel-canning/ [http://perma.cc/YC2Z-ANQD] (opining that the 
NLRB could use a holdover period similar to what some other administrative agencies use). 
167 See 47 U.S.C. § 154 (enabling the FCC to operate).  The FCC has both a similar structure 
to the NLRB and the members’ terms are the same amount of years in length.  See id. 
(explaining the FCC’s structure and membership terms). 
168 Id.  Compare FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, WHAT WE DO, 
http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do [http://perma.cc/HL7J-76KA] [hereinafter FCC, WHAT 
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The FCC is comprised of five commissioners, which the President 
nominates and the Senate confirms.169  FCC members serve five year 
terms, which end when another member is appointed or at the end of the 
next congressional session after their term ends.170  One of the 
commissioners is designated as a chairman, but all of the commissioners 
work together in the regulation of communication services around the 
United States.171 
In 1934, the FCC was created to regulate the radio, and now it does 
that and more by regulating radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.172  
The FCC is the primary authority for communications law similar to the 
NLRB as the primary authority for labor law.173  Overall, the FCC 
regulates communications law to ensure everyone’s rights are 
respected.174 
Due to the changes resulting from New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB and 
NLRB v. Canning, the NLRB could decline in membership and not be able 
to operate.175  Understanding the effect these changes have and the 
Senate’s proposed solution is paramount to the realization that a change 
is needed.176  Thus, Part III analyzes these changes to the NLRB and 
proposes Congress amend the NLRB’s enabling statute.177 
                                                 
WE DO] (regulating “interstate and international communications . . . [as] the United States’ 
primary authority for communications law, regulation and technological innovation”), with 
WHAT WE DO, supra note 3 (“[The NLRB acts as a] safeguard [for] employees’ rights to 
organize and to determine whether to have unions as their bargaining representative.  The 
agency also acts to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices committed by private sector 
employers and unions.”). 
169 47 U.S.C. § 154. 
170 Id. § 154(c).  The FCC’s enabling statute states in relevant part: 
[C]ommissioners shall be appointed for terms of five years and until 
their successors are appointed and have been confirmed and taken the 
oath of office, except that they shall not continue to serve beyond the 
expiration of the next session of Congress subsequent to the expiration 
of said fixed term of office . . . . 
Id. 
171 Id.  This is similar to the commissioner’s role on the NLRB.  See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) 
(“The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board.”). 
172 See FCC, WHAT WE DO, supra note 168 (explaining the FCC’s duties). 
173 Id.; see Millhiser, supra note 4 (stating that without the NLRB no one will protect 
workers’ rights).  In addition, the FCC has many other bureaus and offices, which split up 
the functions of the FCC.  See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, BUREAUS & OFFICES, 
http://www.fcc.gov/bureaus-offices [http://perma.cc/4G9F-7QJT] (displaying all the 
offices the FCC is split into).  The FCC has seven different bureaus that each focus on a 
different part of regulation in communications law.  Id.  There are also eleven different 
offices, which house the departments of the FCC.  Id. 
174 FCC, WHAT WE DO, supra note 168. 
175 See supra Part II.C–D (explaining the case law that affected the NLRB). 
176 See infra Part III (exploring the effects on the NLRB and the Senate’s proposed bill). 
177 See infra Part III (analyzing how these changes affect the NLRB as a whole and 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Despite the NLRB having a new five-member board and making 
minor temporary fixes, it has not implemented a long-term fix to ensure 
trust in future boards and to decrease the likelihood of falling below a 
valid quorum again.178  In order for the NLRB to continue protecting 
employee, employer, and union rights and remain operating as a decision 
maker to stop unfair labor practices, it must maintain enough members to 
constitute a quorum.179  Thus, the NLRB’s enabling statute must change to 
allow the NLRB to safeguard itself from falling to fewer than three 
members and becoming nonoperational.180 
Part III.A examines the effect on current issues, importance of party 
alignment, trust in the NLRB, and possibility of a declining 
membership.181  Next, Part III.B discusses the Senate’s proposed bill to 
change the composition of the NLRB.182  Last, Part III.C proposes an 
amendment to the NLRB’s enabling statute that would allow the NLRB to 
maintain its quorum for a longer period of time, and addresses the 
possible counterarguments to the amendment.183 
A. The Future of the NLRB 
NLRB v. Canning allowed many cases to be appealed.184  Any case the 
invalidated members took a part in may be appealed, but the seven cases 
previously discussed would have the greatest effect on labor and 
employment law as a whole.185  Each of these cases are important to labor 
and employment law and could result in changes to the employees’, 
employers’, and unions’ position in each case if it were appealed.186 
                                                 
proposing an amendment to its’ enabling statute). 
178 See infra Part III.C.1 (establishing a long term fix for the Board). 
179 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–88 (2010) (explaining the quorum 
requirement that was established); see also RIGHTS WE PROTECT, supra note 3 (displaying the 
rights that the NLRB protects). 
180 See supra Part II.C–D (describing two instances when the NLRB’s membership fell 
below three). 
181 See infra Part III.A (exploring the NLRB’s future). 
182 See infra Part III.B (examining the Bill and why it will not work). 
183 See infra Part III.C (proposing a change to the NLRB’s enabling statute and addressing 
the possible counterarguments). 
184 See supra Part II.D (explaining NLRB v. Canning); see also Keith et al., supra note 8 (stating 
that all decisions the NLRB decided from January 2012 until August 2013 are void). 
185 See Polsky, supra note 131 (noting seven cases, which could have a great effect on labor 
and employment law); see also supra notes 134, 139, 146 and accompanying text (presenting 
the seven cases, their facts, and how the courts held in each situation). 
186 See supra Part II.E.1 (describing why each category is important). 
Littlejohn: NLRB v. Canning Featuring the All-Powerful Senate:  The National
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
304 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
In addition to upsetting many cases, the NLRB v. Canning decision 
could also affect the future of the NLRB.187  The NLRB’s staff and the five 
board members is a small group of people to do a large amount of work, 
and with disruption, this task becomes even more difficult.188  The NLRB 
also needs the citizens’ trust in order for employers, employees, and 
unions to abide by its decisions.189  If there is no trust in the NLRB’s 
decisions, employees will be unlikely to speak up and the federal court 
system will become more involved in the labor and employment sector in 
the United States.190  Overall, it is important for the NLRB to operate 
smoothly and efficiently to achieve its goals and keep the trust of the 
citizens it serves.191 
Part III.A.1 reviews the current board operations and how the NLRB 
is anticipating change in the near future.192  Next, Part III.A.2 examines 
how party alignment affects the NLRB.193  Then, Part III.A.3 discusses the 
public’s trust in the NLRB and why it is important to maintain.194  Last, 
Part III.A.4 explores how history repeated itself and the future dangers the 
NLRB could face.195 
1. Current Board Operations 
There are many cases that could change how employers, employees, 
and unions cooperate with one another.196  A change in these rulings could 
                                                 
187 See supra Part II.D (discussing the NLRB v. Canning decision). 
188 See supra Part II.B (explaining the structure of the NLRB); see also infra Part III.A.1–2 
(displaying the current board operations and how the NLRB can make changes to its 
membership). 
189 See infra Part III.A.3 (stating how the NLRB is trying to establish more trust). 
190 See infra Part III.A.3 (explaining why trust in the NLRB’s decisions is important); see also 
infra Part III.A.4 (describing and analyzing the involvement of the federal courts). 
191 See infra Part III.A.3 (considering the importance of trust in the NLRB’s decisions). 
192 See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining how changes could affect the current operations of the 
NLRB). 
193 See infra Part III.A.2 (displaying the importance of party alignment). 
194 See infra Part III.A.3 (analyzing the public’s trust in the NLRB and why it is important). 
195 See infra Part III.A.4 (illustrating the importance of history and how it could affect the 
NLRB’s future). 
196 See supra notes 134–51 and accompanying text (explaining some of the cases which 
could change and why they are important).  The three categories are employee policy, union 
representation, and old precedent.  See supra note 131 (noting the three categories).  Employee 
policy is comprised of:  Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc., 
and Costco Wholesale Corporation.  Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–
13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15656 at *4 (Dec. 14, 2012); Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 
2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15622 at *8 (Sept. 19, 2012); Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 
N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15602 at *16 (Sept. 7, 2012).  Union 
representation is comprised of:  Alan Ritchey, Inc. and Banner Health System.  Alan Ritchey, 
Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15659 at *10 (Dec. 14, 2012); Banner 
Health, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15598 at *2 (July 30, 2012).  Old 
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give the employer too much power and effectively eliminate unions 
altogether, which would decrease the enforcement of employees’ rights.197  
If the NLRB reexamines these rulings, each ruling will take time and 
resources from the NLRB and the parties because of the importance of 
these issues.198 
In addition to the possibility of many cases being reconsidered, the 
NLRB as an entity is at stake.199  Even with a full five members, the NLRB 
has many extraneous issues that need to be considered at the same time 
as any case that it is currently deciding.200  NLRB v. Canning, although 
decided in July 2014, will continue to disrupt the NLRB’s function until 
every case that can be appealed is re-decided.201  If time has to be spent on 
deciding issues that were already decided, the NLRB will have to take its 
focus off of what is currently happening in the labor and employment 
sector.202 
Even though the NLRB has not re-examined any cases, there have 
been multiple instances when the current Board’s focus shifted to past 
problems, including:  the unanimous ratification of administrative, 
personnel, and procurement matters; the heightened media focus on the 
NLRB causing it to weigh in on many extraneous issues; and the 
discussion of a possible change in the NLRB’s makeup proposed by the 
Senate’s new bill.203  Since the NLRB’s focus shifted to these issues, until 
                                                 
precedent is comprised of:  Piedmont Gardens and WKTC-TV, Inc.  Piedmont Gardens, 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 15, 2012); WKTC-TV, Inc., 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15653 at *8 (Dec. 12, 2012). 
197 See Millhiser, supra note 4 (illustrating the effect of giving employers too much power); 
see also King & Leitch, supra note 111 (analyzing the impact of NLRB v. Canning).  However, 
if the NLRB’s membership stays the same, the rulings might not change at all.  See Dubé, 
supra note 99 (explaining that because the Board makeup is the same there will probably be 
no “major policy shifts”). 
198 See King & Leitch, supra note 111 (stating that reexamining cases could take an 
extraordinary amount of time). 
199 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) (holding that there was 
not a valid quorum of members); see also NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014) 
(invalidating President Obama’s recess appointments to the NLRB, which took away the 
valid quorum). 
200 See Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14 (“[A]ll five slots on the NLRB are now filled 
by Senate-confirmed appointees—this solution is only temporary.  NLRB members serve five 
year terms, so the Senate GOP will get another opportunity to shut down federal labor law 
when these terms expire . . . .”). 
201 See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (holding that three of President Obama’s recess 
appointments were invalid and requiring all of those members to vacate the NLRB). 
202 See supra Part II.E.1 (describing the cases that may have to be examined). 
203 See Office of Public Affairs, supra note 126 (ratifying all administrative, personnel, and 
procurement matters); see also Mahoney, supra note 152 (commenting that this bill is a needed 
reform for the NLRB due to one-sided decisions); Taylor, supra note 128 (opining that some 
of the cases the NLRB is currently deciding will have a big impact on companies and the 
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the NLRB resolves these matters, it will continue to take its eyes off current 
issues.204 
Although a replacement was found for Nancy Schiffer’s position on 
the NLRB, there is still a concern that when Harry Johnson’s and Kent 
Hirozawa’s terms end in the next two years, there will be no 
replacements.205  In January 2015, the Senate will have a Republican 
majority and the President will still be a Democrat, which means gridlock 
is likely because there will probably not be an agreement on a presidential 
appointment.206  In addition, depending on the results of the next 
presidential election, gridlock could remain, which is why an amendment 
is needed to the NLRB’s enabling statute.207 
2. The NLRB Should be Modified to be Able to Withstand Party 
Alignment 
The Senate’s alignment is important to the NLRB because it 
determines whether a President’s NLRB nomination is confirmed.208  In 
the past, when the President appointed a member belonging to the 
political party opposite to the majority in the Senate, the nomination was 
not confirmed.209  Recently, the Senate proposed the “nuclear option” to 
prevent the delay of appointments; however, the “nuclear option” still 
requires a Senate majority to vote in favor of the nomination.210  Although 
                                                 
economy); Wemple, supra note 128 (remarking that the NLRB’s ruling for CNN was drastic 
for affected workers). 
204 See Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (showing that some of the cases the NLRB may have to 
reexamine are controversial decisions); see also Dubé, supra note 99 (admitting that this 
reexamination will take the NLRB a lot of time); King & Leitch, supra note 111 (noting the 
amount of cases the NLRB may have to reexamine); supra note 203 and accompanying text 
(explaining all the current issues the NLRB’s focus shifted to). 
205 See Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (adding that if the Senate and President disagree on 
appointees for these nominations, the NLRB will be in trouble); see also supra Part II.E 
(discussing the aftermath of NLRB v. Canning). 
206 See Flaherty, supra note 119 (stating that Republicans could vote against any 
appointments President Obama makes); see also ROSENFELD, supra note 35, at 16–18 
(expanding on the concepts that Republicans do not support unions and the comparison to 
supporting the NLRB). 
207 See infra Part III.C.1 (explaining the proposed amendment to the NLRB’s enabling 
statute). 
208 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing presidential appointment power); see also 
supra Part II.B (explaining the presidential appointment process, and the requirement that 
both steps of the process be met in order for someone to be appointed to the NLRB).  
209 See, e.g., Nominations Failed/Returned, UNITED STATES SENATE (Jan. 3, 2014), 
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/one_item_and_teasers/nom_rtn.htm 
[http://perma.cc/EBF9-6FXJ] (displaying a list of executive nominations returned to the 
President during the current Congress). 
210 See Wolf, supra note 72 (describing all of the components of the “nuclear option”).  See 
also Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14 (stating the reasons why the Senate invoked the 
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this new option puts less of a burden on the agreement of the Senate and 
the President, the Senate can still delay the confirmation if they do not 
agree with the President’s nomination simply by a majority not voting in 
favor of the nomination.211 
The checks and balances system of presidential appointment is 
important to ensure one branch does not have too much power.212  
Unfortunately, in a political gridlock, the checks and balances system 
provides a daunting obstacle for appointment.213  In short, if there is not 
an agreement on a nomination, no one will be appointed to the NLRB, and 
without recess appointment power, the NLRB will not receive new 
members until the President and Senate agree.214 
The President’s party affiliation is also an important factor regarding 
members being appointed to the NLRB.215  Although the NLRB performs 
many functions in labor and employment law, the NLRA created the 
NLRB to ensure workers were able to collectively bargain and join unions; 
many people are not in favor of keeping the NLRB operational for this 
reason.216  In the past, some Presidents, notably Republicans, have not 
appointed members to the NLRB for many years during their terms.217  
Although this neglect has not destroyed the NLRB, with time, the lack of 
                                                 
“nuclear option”). 
211 See Hatch, supra note 71, at 12 (stating that the threshold for nominations is now a 
majority of Senate members rather than two-thirds).  Even with the “nuclear option” 
imposed, there still has to be a vote of fifty-one Senate members in favor of appointing the 
nominee.  Id. 
212 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President the power to appoint members to 
administrative positions with the advice and consent of the Senate). 
213 See id. (requiring both the President and Senate to agree on an appointment).  Although 
this Note does not address a change to the appointment process, it seems that a change is 
needed to ensure one party or branch cannot prevent appointments from being made. 
214 See Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (arguing that the next time there is a vacancy on the 
NLRB and the President and Senate do not agree, there could be problems).  If no one is 
appointed, the NLRB’s membership will fall, which could result in gridlock on decision-
making if there are two members from either party on the Board.  Id. 
215 See Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 80, at 225 (explaining all the ways partisanship 
interrupted appointing members to the NLRB); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text 
(comparing the President’s nominations to the NLRB). 
216 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 16–20 (describing the creation of the 
NLRB and the NLRB’s relation to collective bargaining and union membership).  The NLRB 
has a history of supporting unions, and it is a known fact that many Republicans are not 
union supporters.  See also ROSENFELD, supra note 35, at 16–18 (elaborating further on the 
Republican disapproval of unions). 
217 Compare BOARD MEMBERS SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (showing when each member of the 
NLRB was appointed), with Prints and Photographs Division, supra note 79 (presenting a list 
of all of the Presidents and the years they served).  For example, President George W. Bush 
did not appoint anyone to the NLRB between the beginning of 2006 until the end of his term 
in 2009, which left the board with only two members from 2008 until 2010.  Id. 
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appointment by Presidents and the lack of agreement between the 
President and the Senate could destroy the NLRB.218 
The NLRB’s operation depends on the Senate, the President, and their 
party alignment.219  This Note does not propose to ameliorate the 
cooperation problems between the Senate and the President, but rather 
proposes a solution that will allow the NLRB to continue operation for a 
longer period of time if the Senate and President do not agree.220 
3. Trust in the NLRB’s Decisions 
NLRB v. Canning not only invalidated many cases, but also caused the 
NLRB to lose the public’s trust in its decision making.221  In the past five 
years, as a result of not having a valid quorum, there have been two 
instances where hundreds of cases were invalidated.222  When the NLRB 
decides cases, the parties expect that these decisions are final unless a 
party appeals to a federal court.223  Since the NLRB’s invalidations, this 
                                                 
218 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (demonstrating the requirement of the advice and 
consent of the Senate in order to appoint members to administrative agencies).  In addition 
to the problems of appointment and agreement, the lack of union support and the dissolution 
of unions could have an adverse effect on the NLRB.  See Labor Day Brings Focus to Economy, 
supra note 35 (showing a declining union membership).  See also Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra 
note 80, at 225 (stating the ways that conservatives in 2011 attempted to limit the NLRB’s 
power).  Critics Kahlenberg and Marvit stated that: 
In 2011 alone, there were a variety of approaches that conservatives took 
to limit the Board’s power, including Republican senators’ refusal to 
confirm President Obama’s appointments to the Board, threats by 
Republican members of the Board to resign in order to strip the Board 
of a quorum and therefore its ability to adjudicate allegations of unfair 
labor practices, the introduction of legislation designed to partially or 
fully defund the Board, and the introduction of legislation designed to 
abolish the Board and transfer its functions to the Department of Justice. 
Id. 
219 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (presenting the requirements for presidential 
appointment); see also supra note 209 and accompanying text (displaying how many 
nominations failed confirmation to an administrative agency and how many have been 
returned to the President). 
220 See infra Part III.C (establishing a solution for the NLRB’s operation and appointment 
problems). 
221 See McQuillen, supra note 121 (raising issues of trust in past NLRB actions).  These issues 
of trust “add to the criticism of the board, which mediates disputes between labor and 
employers.”  Id. 
222 See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014) (invalidating President Obama’s 
recess appointments to the NLRB); New Process Steel v. N.L.R.B., 560 U.S. 674, 688 (2010) 
(requiring the NLRB to have a quorum of three to decide cases). 
223 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012) (establishing the process for appeals to NLRB decisions); see 
also Lee III & Willging, supra note 62, at 770 (justifying that parties may not want to appeal 
because of the high cost of entering the federal court system). 
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expectation is changing and the trust that parties once had in the NLRB is 
dwindling.224 
This loss of trust could cause parties to cast doubt on the NLRB’s 
decisions, which in turn could cause parties additional stress, time, and 
money in the long run.225  For example, if the NLRB holds that an 
employer wrongfully discharged an employee based on a collective 
bargaining agreement interpretation, that employee will have his or her 
job reinstated and possibly receive back-pay.226  Months later, after the 
employer and employee have both made adjustments, they are informed 
that the NLRB did not have a valid quorum to decide this case.227  This 
invalidation could trigger the employer to appeal the holding, which 
would not only cost parties time and money, but would place the 
employee in a state of limbo until the NLRB reexamines the case.228  In the 
end, the NLRB caused the parties more stress, more money, and gave 
them doubt in the NLRB’s future decisions.229 
4. History Repeats Itself 
There have been several instances when the NLRB’s membership fell 
below three.230  History is known to repeat itself, so there is a likely chance 
that the NLRB’s membership will fall again.231  The decline of the NLRB’s 
membership was only a small problem in the past because the President 
                                                 
224 See supra Part II.E.1 (explaining the cases which were invalidated). 
225 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116–17 (confirming that most federal 
courts will uphold NLRB decisions); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text 
(commenting how appealing to a federal circuit court can cause more problems). 
226 See Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 
(Dec. 15, 2012) (requiring an employer to turn over the names of witnesses who reported a 
nurse sleeping on the job in order to justify firing her).  This scenario is based off of Piedmont 
Gardens with some added facts to fit the scenario.  Id. at *1–2. 
227 See New Process Steel, 560 U.S. at 688 (holding that the NLRB must have a three member 
quorum to decide cases).   
228 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 118 (noting that appealing to a federal 
court puts both the employer and the employee in limbo); see also Lee III & Willging, supra 
note 62, at 770 (describing that appealing to a federal court can cost between $15,000 and 
$20,000). 
229 See supra Part III.A.3 (elaborating on citizens’ trust in the NLRB).  Piedmont Gardens was 
on appeal and has finally been reexamined by the NLRB.  Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. 
No. 46, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15668 at *5 (Dec. 15, 2012) (adding that this case was 
appealed in June 2013 and was not reexamined by the NLRB until June 2015); Piedmont 
Gardens, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 2015 WL 4179692 at *8 (June 26, 2015) (affirming the previous 
ruling). 
230 See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (showing the amount of members 
on the Board every year since the Board’s creation). 
231 See Millhiser, supra note 4 (“When the current members terms expire, however, a 
Supreme Court decision gutting the recess appointments power could make it impossible to 
fill the NLRB’s vacant seats.”). 
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had the power to recess-appoint members if the Senate did not agree on 
his nomination.232  Now, however, the problem of a declining membership 
will be more difficult to fix because recess appointment power is 
limited.233 
If the NLRB’s membership falls below three members, it does not have 
a quorum to decide cases according to New Process Steel.234  Without a way 
to decide cases, the NLRB cannot help employers, employees, or unions 
with their labor and employment issues.235  This decline in membership 
leaves the parties with no choice but to appeal to federal court if they are 
unhappy with the regional NLRB’s decision.236  As a result, this decline 
would cause the federal courts to be flooded with labor and employment 
issues.237 
The federal courts are not experts in labor and employment law.238  If 
the federal courts handled every appeal to a regional NLRB decision, it 
would defeat the purpose of having an administrative agency that has an 
expertise in labor and employment law.239  The federal courts already 
handle a multitude of issues and are overburdened by other cases.240  If 
the courts added labor and employment issues to the list of cases they 
must handle, these issues would further congest the court system.241  In 
addition, if parties appeal cases to the federal courts, the cost and time 
                                                 
232 See id. (explaining that without recess appointment power, filling NLRB seats will be 
even more difficult); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (displaying the Recess Appointments 
Clause). 
233 See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2566, 2575 (2014) (analyzing that recess 
appointments are allowed only when the Senate has taken a break for longer than ten days, 
and the Senate gets to declare when it is in session). 
234 See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–88 (2010) (holding that three 
members constitutes a quorum for the NLRB). 
235 See 159 CONG. REC. S302 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2013) (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander) 
(stating that without three members, the NLRB cannot decide cases or issue regulations). 
236 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116–20 (explaining the NLRB’s relation 
to the federal courts). 
237 See Jamieson, supra note 160 (arguing that the Senate’s bill will “create new burdens on 
already clogged federal courts that lack the NLRB’s expertise on labor relations”); see also 
supra note 65 and accompanying text (establishing the argument that federal courts could 
become overburdened without a national level to the NLRB). 
238 See Dotan, supra note 63, at 1022 (noting that administrative agencies have more 
expertise than Federal Courts); see also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 116–17 
(admitting that because federal courts are not experts in labor and employment law they 
rarely change NLRB rulings). 
239 See Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 80, at 226 (arguing that without the NLRB “the 
effect on workers would be dramatic” because there would be no one with an expertise in 
enforcing the NLRA). 
240 See Introduction, supra note 65, at 685 (describing that the overburdening of the federal 
court system leads to delay and more expenses). 
241 See id. (discussing the overburdening of the federal court system). 
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parties spend on each case will increase.242  Thus, without the NLRB to 
decide cases, both parties involved in the conflict and the federal court 
system would be unduly burdened. 
The future of the NLRB is in jeopardy.243  If there is not a change to the 
NLRB’s enabling statute in the future, the NLRB could face membership 
decline to the point of extinction.244  This amendment to the NLRB’s 
enabling statute is important to not only keep the NLRB operational, but 
also to protect employee, employer, and union rights.245  The NLRB was 
created to provide expertise in labor and employment law and this Note 
proposes a solution to ensure that expertise can still be exercised.246 
B. The Senate’s Proposed Bill is Not a Solution to the NLRB’s Problems 
In short, the Bill is an amendment that would obstruct the NLRB’s 
function in the future.247  Although the NLRB needs a change, the Bill is 
not the solution to the NLRB’s problems because it will end in a 
nonfunctional Board.248  The Senate’s Proposed Bill would amend the 
NLRB to function much like the Federal Election Commission, which has 
been known as one of the most ineffective administrative agencies due to 
its gridlock and inaction.249  There are many reasons why the Bill is not a 
solution to the NLRB’s problems, such as:  gridlock in decision-making, 
                                                 
242 See Lee III & Willging, supra note 62, at 770 (stating that the average median cost for 
taking a civil case to federal court is $15,000 for the plaintiff and $20,000 for the defendant). 
243 See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2566, 2575 (2014) (eliminating most recess 
appointment power); see also New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 679–88 (2010) 
(requiring three members for a quorum). 
244 See Millhiser, supra note 4 (“Ultimately, the fate of the NLRB—and of American labor 
law—will hinge upon who controls the Senate and the White House.  If both the president 
and the Senate want America to continue to have labor law in 2018, then confirming new 
NLRB members should not be an issue.”). 
245 See infra Part III.C (describing the change the NLRB needs to make to its enabling 
statute).  See also Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 80, at 226 (explaining the effect on workers 
when the NLRB is extinct).  A former Chairman on the NLRB and a current Stanford Law 
professor said that if there was no NLRB “[w]orkers illegally fired for union organizing 
won’t be reinstated with back pay.  Employers will be able to get away with interfering with 
union elections.  Perhaps most important, employers won’t have to recognize unions despite 
a majority vote by workers.”  Id. 
246 See infra Part III.C (elaborating on the proposed solution to the NLRB’s problems). 
247 See supra Part II.E.2 (establishing the components of the Bill). 
248 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. (2014) (showing the elements of the Bill); see also supra Part II.E.2 
(noting the components of the Bill). 
249 See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (2012) (explaining the Federal Election Commission’s structure); 
Franz, supra note 154, at 167 (stating that the Federal Election Commission is one of the most 
ineffective agencies and was designed by Congress to be slow and ineffective); see also 
Mahoney, supra note 152 (commenting that the Bill transforms the NLRB to the same 
organization as the Federal Election Commission). 
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possible loss of funding, and a harsher appointment quota and 
standard.250 
One of the reasons the Bill will not fix the NLRB’s current problems is 
that this change will create gridlock.251  The Bill requires two members 
from each party to agree on a solution, which would be a difficult, if not 
an impossible task for the NLRB.252  As previously stated, the NLRB must 
take either the employee or management side, and it is known that many 
employment rights supporters and management supporters do not 
agree.253  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that members who support 
opposite views would agree on any issue.254  In addition, it is rare for 
parties to make decisions against party lines.255  For example, Congress 
often goes into gridlock because parties will not vote against party lines.256  
Creating gridlock on the NLRB will be detrimental to its operation because 
even with a full board, decisions will not be made if the parties cannot 
agree.257 
The Bill will also hinder the NLRB because it could cause the NLRB to 
lose its funding.258  If the NLRB does go into gridlock on some decisions, 
                                                 
250 See infra Part II.E.2 (displaying the components of the Bill). 
251 Compare S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (noting the requirement that two Democrat 
members and two Republican members be in favor of the vote in order for it to go through), 
with Phenicie, supra note 127 (stating that an even number of Republican and Democrat 
members creates gridlock). 
252 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(C) (explaining the requirements of the agreement of 
the Senate and the President to appoint members to the NLRB). 
253 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 176 (reasoning that the conflict between 
union and management will not end any time soon).  Critics argue that: 
Although one might wish that labor and management could find a 
common ground in accepting both the statutory rules that Congress has 
laid down in the Labor Act and the Board’s role as impartial arbiter of 
those rules, there is little evidence that partisan bickering and hostility 
will soon disappear. 
Id.; see also Jamieson, supra note 160 (adding that “[a] permanent, even split along partisan 
lines” would allow “contentious labor cases” to go on for a long time and this is comparable 
to “establishing a 10-member Supreme Court, permanently comprised of five liberals and 
five conservatives”). 
254 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 176 (discussing that it seems unlikely 
that parties will find a common ground). 
255 See Mann, supra note 152 (stating that Congress is reflecting ideological differences and 
creating more gridlock). 
256 See Blake, supra note 152 (“[T]he percentage of gridlocked . . . issues has more than 
doubled since 1950 and is close to a new high . . . .”). 
257 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (explaining that two members from either party must 
agree on a holding); see also Gerhards, supra note 153 (commenting on the portions of the 
Bill). 
258 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20(a) (declaring that the NLRB must decide ninety percent of 
its cases within the first year in order to maintain its normal funding). 
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it will run the risk of losing twenty percent of its funding.259  This scenario 
could happen easily because ten percent is a small number of cases to 
disagree about.260  For example, if the NLRB handled 500 cases during the 
year after this amendment is passed, it would only need to be gridlocked 
on fifty-one cases to lose twenty percent of its funding.261  When any 
agency loses funding, it has fewer resources to accomplish its goals.262 
Finally, the Bill is not the solution the NLRB needs because it would 
require even more members to be appointed with a harsher appointment 
standard.263  The NLRB has a history of struggling to maintain enough 
members for a quorum of three.264  However, the Bill raises that 
requirement to four members for a quorum.265  This provision means that 
the quorum requirement will not only be hard to meet because members 
might not agree, but also because membership could very easily fall below 
four.266  In addition, the Bill requires the President and Senate to agree two 
times in order for a member to be appointed.267  NLRB v. Canning arose 
because the Senate and President could not agree on appointing members 
to the NLRB, and in that instance the President and Senate only needed to 
agree once.268  This feat was difficult then, and it will be nearly impossible 
for them to agree twice.269 
                                                 
259 See id. (requiring the decision of ninety percent of cases within the first year, or there 
will be a loss of twenty percent funding). 
260 See Jamieson, supra note 160 (articulating that this funding would be easy to lose 
because a “dead-even partisan split” would make it even more difficult to reach decisions). 
261 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20(a) (establishing percentage requirements to lose funding). 
262 See id. (promoting the decrease in funding of the NLRB); see also H.R. 1, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (calling for an eighteen percent decrease in the NLRB’s budget). 
263 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(C) (creating the new requirements for appointment). 
264 See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (depicting the NLRB’s membership 
since the Board’s creation). 
265 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(B)–(C) (stating the new membership requirement of 
six members). 
266 See Shapiro et al., supra note 114 (predicting that the next time a vacancy is not filled 
because the President and Senate do not agree, there could be problems). 
267 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(C) (requiring the President to consult the opposite 
party leader in the Senate for appointment and for the Senate to consent to the nomination). 
268 See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014) (highlighting why the invalidated 
members were on the Board and showing why President Obama used the recess 
appointment power); see also U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (explaining that the Senate must 
confirm presidential appointments). 
269 See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557 (limiting the President’s recess appointment power); see 
also Bolton, supra note 103 (commenting that the reason President Obama had to use recess 
appointment power was because the Senate continually refused to confirm his 
appointments, and the Senate even conducted pro forma sessions to prevent recess 
appointments). 
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If passed, the Bill will turn the NLRB into a non-functional 
administrative agency similar to the Federal Election Commission.270  It 
imposes requirements on the NLRB that, based on the Board’s history, 
would be impossible to achieve.271  Overall, the Bill is not a solution; it is 
a plan to dissolve the NLRB altogether.272 
C. A Solution for the Future 
The NLRB should use the FCC’s model to rewrite its enabling 
statute.273  The agencies are similar in structure and both are experts in 
their respective areas of law, which require regulation.274  In addition, the 
FCC has never had a membership issue.275  The FCC’s enabling statute, in 
pertinent part, states: 
[C]ommissioners shall be appointed for terms of five 
years and until their successors are appointed and have 
been confirmed and taken the oath of office, except that 
they shall not continue to serve beyond the expiration of 
the next session of Congress subsequent to the expiration 
of said fixed term of office . . . .276 
The NLRB’s enabling statute does not have a provision which extends a 
member’s term until a new member is appointed.277  This Note 
recommends an amendment to the NLRB’s enabling statute that includes 
this language.278 
First, Part III.C.1 establishes the amendment that Congress should 
make to the NLRB’s enabling statute.279  Next, Part III.C.2 addresses the 
                                                 
270 See Franz, supra note 154, at 167 (establishing why the Federal Election Commission is 
an ineffective commission).  The Federal Election Commission has gone into gridlock many 
times and rarely makes any decisions.  Id.  In addition, it seems as though it was organized 
this way in order to make sure it was unable to act.  Id. 
271 See supra Part II.A (reviewing the history of the NLRB); see also S. 2814, 113th Cong. 
(showing the requirements the Bill imposes). 
272 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. (displaying the Bill); see also Jamieson, supra note 160 (“This is 
the destruction of the NLRB, and they know it . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
273 See supra Part II.F (explaining the FCC and its organizational structure). 
274 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (comparing the functions of the NLRB and 
FCC). 
275 See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, COMMISSIONERS FROM 1934 TO PRESENT, 
http://www.fcc.gov/leadership/commissioners-1934-present [http://perma.cc/L2F9-
946M] (discussing the continuing membership of the FCC). 
276 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012).  
277 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (illustrating the provisions of the NLRB’s enabling statute). 
278 See infra Part III.C.1 (explaining the language that should be added to the NLRB’s 
enabling statute). 
279 See infra Part III.C.1 (stating the text which should be added to 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012)). 
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commentary and possible counterarguments regarding this 
amendment.280  Overall, this amendment would be an immediate and 
long-term solution to the NLRB’s operational problem.281 
1. Proposed Amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 153 
Amending the NLRB’s enabling statute will allow the NLRB to 
maintain a larger membership for a longer period of time and help to 
dissolve any possible gridlock with the election of a new Senate.282  The 
enabling statute with the amendment will state: 
(a) Creation, composition, appointment, and tenure; 
Chairman; removal of members 
The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called 
the “Board”) created by this subchapter prior to its 
amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act, 
1947 [29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.], is continued as an agency of 
the United States, except that the Board shall consist of 
five instead of three members, appointed by the President 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.  Of the 
two additional members so provided for, one shall be 
appointed for a term of five years and the other for a term 
of two years.  Their successors, and the successors of the 
other members, shall be appointed for terms of five years 
each, excepting that any individual chosen to fill a 
vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term 
of the member whom he shall succeed.  If, when a board 
member’s term is set to expire, a new board member has not yet 
been appointed, then the current board member shall extend his 
term until a new member is appointed, except that his term shall 
not extend beyond the end of the next congressional session.  
The President shall designate one member to serve as 
Chairman of the Board.  Any member of the Board may 
be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, 
for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no 
other cause.283 
                                                 
280 See infra Part III.C.2 (addressing the counterarguments to this Note’s solution). 
281 See supra Part II.C–D (describing two times in which the NLRB was unable to function). 
282 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (displaying the current enabling statute of the NLRB).  This Note 
proposes changes to the current form of this statute. 
283 The regular portion of the text comes from 29 U.S.C. § 153(a).  The italicized portion of 
the text represents the additions made by the author.  In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)–(d) are 
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2. Commentary 
This amendment is a proven solution of other independent agencies, 
and it will be the best solution to the NLRB’s membership problems.284  
Most importantly, the proposed amendment allows the NLRB to meet its 
quorum requirement for longer periods of time.285  When a member’s term 
ends after five years, if the President and Senate have not agreed upon a 
new member, the old member will stay on the NLRB and continue 
working.286  This extension would end at the earlier of either:  (1) the 
Senate and President agreeing on a new member; or (2) the end of the next 
congressional session.287  This process allows for a new Congress to be 
elected, the possibility of a change in Congress’ political majority, and 
more time for the President and Senate to reach an agreement on a new 
member.288 
This amendment is also necessary because the intent when creating 
the NLRB was not for it to be inactive, but for it to be able to aid the people 
of this country and the bodies of government by deciding and 
administrating the labor laws of the country.289  The NLRA created the 
NLRB for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the NLRA, and it is 
                                                 
recommended to remain the same. 
284 See Borkoski, supra note 166 (stating that a holdover provision has worked with other 
agencies).  It is important that this solution is implemented as soon as possible because next 
year is when members’ terms begin to end and without this amendment and recess 
appointments, there is a chance that no one will be appointed to the NLRB.  See id. (opining 
that appointments will be difficult in the future). 
285 See New Process Steel, L.P., 560 U.S. 674, 679–88 (2010) (holding that three members 
constitute a quorum for the NLRB). 
286 See supra Part III.C.1 (displaying the proposed amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)). 
287 See 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012) (establishing the FCC’s power as a commission).  This 
proposed amendment is modeled off of the language from the FCC’s enabling statute.  See 
47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (showing the language that makes up the FCC’s enabling statute). 
288 See Borkoski, supra note 166 (discussing that allowing for a holdover period would help 
the NLRB to fix its problems).  Although this solution does not fix the problems of recess 
appointments and the President and Senate not agreeing on an appointee, it does give the 
NLRB more time and allows for a new Congress to be elected, which could solve the 
disagreement between the President and Senate.  Id. 
289 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 16–20 (explaining the creation of the 
NLRB).  If the NLRB were to cease to exist: 
[T]here will be no one to enforce workers’ rights to join a union without 
intimidation from their employer.  No one to enforce workers’ rights to 
join together to oppose abusive work conditions.  And no one to make 
an employer actually bargain with a union.  Without an NLRB to enforce 
the law, it may be possible for an employer to round up all of their pro-
union workers, fire them, and then replace them with anti-union scabs 
who will immediately call a vote to decertify the union. 
Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14; see also supra Part II.A (examining the history of the 
NLRB). 
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imperative that the NLRB have the power to do so.290  Without an 
enforcement board, the NLRA would not be followed and employees 
would not have any guarantees in their rights.291 
This amendment is the best solution to solve the NLRB’s membership 
problems because it can be easily implemented and it is a small change 
that will have a large impact on the NLRB.292  The amendment simply 
adds one sentence to the NLRB’s enabling statute.293  It would not change 
the appointment process, and it would not take any power away from 
either the Senate or the President.294  This change will allow the NLRB to 
decide more cases with a valid board and will encourage the Senate to 
negotiate with the President prior to the end of the next congressional 
session.295  Overall, this small change could have a large impact on the 
NLRB’s operation.296 
Critics may argue that the Bill is a better solution than this amendment 
because it will “take the politics out of it” and turn the NLRB into an 
umpire.297  Although the Bill may require Republican and Democratic 
members of the NLRB to find common ground on some issues, it will most 
likely gridlock the NLRB on controversial or difficult issues.298  The 
solution this Note proposes still allows for the Senate to check the 
President’s nomination by voting either for it to pass or sending it back to 
                                                 
290 See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (creating the 
original NLRA); see also S. 1958, 74th Cong. (1935) (highlighting that the intent to create the 
NLRB was to enforce the NLRA). 
291 See Millhiser, Nuclear Option, supra note 14 (arguing that without an NLRB there would 
be no one enforce the proper treatment of workers); see also MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra 
note 30, at 18 (stating that President Roosevelt commented that the NLRB will create a better 
relationship between employees and employers). 
292 See The Legislative Process, supra note 15 (explaining how a statute is amended).  First, a 
bill must be proposed which is structured similar to the Senate’s bill.  Id.  The bill must pass 
a majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.  Id.  Last, the President 
must sign the bill and then 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) will be amended.  Id. 
293 See supra note 283 and accompanying text (displaying the proposed sentence that 
should be added to the NLRB’s enabling statute). 
294 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (mandating both the President and Senate confirm an 
appointment to an administrative agency). 
295 See Borkoski, supra note 166 (suggesting that a holdover period after the end of 
someone’s term may help to fix the NLRB’s membership problems); see also FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, supra note 275 (displaying the FCC’s membership from the 
time it was created).  The amendment is modeled off of the language from the FCC’s enabling 
statute.  See 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012) (showing the FCC’s enabling statute). 
296 See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (illustrating all the vacancies the 
NLRB has had). 
297 See Cox, supra note 152 (arguing that the Bill is a good solution). 
298 See Jamieson, supra note 160 (“It is possible that on some issues, the six members might 
find a common ground, in the interest of deciding cases, . . . [b]ut for anything novel, 
controversial or difficult, it is hard to see how they would find a way forward.  They would 
spend a lot of time negotiating, I guess.  Or at war.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
Littlejohn: NLRB v. Canning Featuring the All-Powerful Senate:  The National
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
318 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
the President.299  The Bill will cause cases to be unresolved for years and 
could possibly result in a loss of twenty percent of the funding if there is 
gridlock.300  Therefore, the proposed amendment to the NLRB’s enabling 
statute this Note proposes is a better solution because it will allow more 
time for less-partisan members to be appointed—which satisfies the Bill’s 
goal of less partisanship on the board—and will not threaten the NLRB’s 
dissolution by creating more gridlock.301 
Furthermore, critics may argue that this amendment will only delay 
the possible bad times where the NLRB will not have enough members to 
operate.  This argument is flawed because it does not consider that by 
delaying the end to a member’s term, there could be a change in the 
composition of the Senate, which would allow for agreement on a new 
appointment.302  In addition, this amendment allows the NLRB more time 
to make decisions on cases regarding unfair labor practices.303  In short, 
this amendment does not delay bad times; it proposes a practical solution 
to the NLRB’s membership problem.304 
Finally, critics may argue that the NLRB’s dissolution might not be a 
bad thing, considering the Board’s inactivity.  If this were true and the 
NLRB was dissolved, the United States would revert back to the times 
before the NLRB was created.305  Before the NLRB was created, many 
corporations and unions resorted to violence to solve their problems and 
employees were voiceless in their workplaces.306  Without the NLRB, 
employees would have to go to the federal courts about their problems in 
the workplace, which takes much more time and money for both the 
employee and the courts.307  Although the NLRB has lost its quorum a few 
times within the past five years, it has still been there to remedy those 
situations, and without the NLRB, employees would have no guarantee of 
                                                 
299 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring both the President and Senate to agree on a 
presidential appointment to an agency). 
300 See S. 2814, 113th Cong. § 20(a) (2014) (establishing that two Republicans and two 
Democrats must agree on every decision passed and if ninety percent of the cases are not 
decided within a year the NLRB will lose twenty percent of its funding); see also Jamieson, 
supra note 160 (scrutinizing that the Bill is not a solution to the NLRB’s problems). 
301 See supra Part III.C.1 (explaining the amendment to the NLRB’s enabling statute). 
302 See supra Part III.C.1 (displaying that a member’s term shall not end until someone else 
is appointed or until the end of the next congressional session, whichever is sooner). 
303 See supra Part II.F (expanding on how this works with the FCC); see also supra Part III.C.1 
(showing the amendment to the NLRB’s enabling statute). 
304 See MEMBERS OF THE NLRB SINCE 1935, supra note 11 (establishing the members on the 
NLRB and how many vacancies and recess appointments the Board has had). 
305 See supra Part II.A (describing the history of the NLRB). 
306 See MCCULLOCH & BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 184–85 (asserting that the NLRB fixed 
problems with violence and workers being heard in the workplace). 
307 See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons why federal 
courts would be overburdened and are not experts in administrative law). 
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their rights.308  Overall, the proposed amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 153 is the 
best solution to solve the NLRB’s membership problems.309 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Every agency is created for a reason—the NLRA created the NLRB 
because it needed an agency to enforce the rights the NLRA guarantees.310  
The NLRB is on the verge of extinction because there have been two major 
instances in the past five years that have rendered the agency powerless.311  
The current NLRB members’ terms will end at varying points from now 
until 2018, and if no amendment is made to the NLRB’s enabling statute, 
there will be more opportunities for the NLRB to lose its quorum.312  
Amending the NLRB’s enabling statute is a minor change to allow 
membership to extend for a longer period of time.313  If this change is 
implemented, Grace, the teacher from Part I, will have a way to appeal to 
the NLRB and possibly get her job back.314  This solution would not only 
give the NLRB more time to operate, but also more time for the President 
and Senate to agree on a nomination.315  The NLRB needs a change and 
the proposed amendment will allow it to withstand the disagreement in 
appointing members.316 
Elizabeth Littlejohn* 
                                                 
308 See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text (showing the effect of more cases on the 
federal courts).  See also supra Part II.C–D (showing the two times in the past five years the 
NLRB has lost its quorum). 
309 See supra note 283 and accompanying text (resolving the NLRB’s problems); see also 
supra Part III.C.2 (evaluating why the solution this Note proposes is the best solution). 
310 See supra Part II.A (expanding on the creation of the NLRB). 
311 See supra Part II.C–D (describing both of the cases that caused the NLRB to be 
powerless). 
312 See supra Part III.D (enabling the NLRB to act for a longer period of time). 
313 See supra Part III.C.1 (showing the proposed amendment to the NLRB’s enabling 
statute). 
314 See supra Part I (establishing the fictional scenario involving Grace). 
315 See supra Part III.C (examining the amendment and the counterarguments and 
defenses). 
316 See supra Part III.C.2 (arguing why the proposed amendment is a good solution against 
all the counterarguments). 
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